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“Suez was . . . a crossroads from which everybody drove off in wrong 
directions, the Americans as much as the British and the French, and the Arabs 
as well as the Israelis.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A. A War of Self-Defense?   
Suez was a war of choice. The first step to start such a war begins with the 
domestic constitutional process. The mobilized constitutional regime of a 
country drives diplomatic action and military planning, as well as the 
consciousness of the body politic, into a conclusion that war is the preferred 
solution. In Long Wars and the Constitution2 and in War Powers,3 Stephen M. 
Griffin and Mariah Zeisberg respectively devote their considerable scholarly 
skills to analyze the historical and normative aspects of the American 
constitutional regime of War Powers. Both Griffin and Zeisberg highlight the 
interaction between the executive and legislative branches under the American 
constitution.4 Both explore the explicit power of Congress to declare war 
against the long U.S. experience of heavy executive involvement in opening a 
war as well as executing it.5 Griffin and Zeisberg do not address the option of 
deploying the same constitutional processes for the purpose of avoiding a war 
altogether.6 Nor do they address the perspective of comparative constitutional 
law, i.e., how other countries activate their constitutional regimes for the 
purpose of starting a war. In this Article I introduce these missing aspects. 
Thus, I add dimensions to Griffin and Zeisberg’s excellent books, using the 
events surrounding the Suez War to provide a comparative analysis of different 
constitutional regimes and their interplay with diplomacy. 
 
* The author wishes to thank Prof. Ari Afilalo, Professor Vernon Bogdanor, Amalya 
Schreier, Elizabeth Nagle, Caleb French, Thomas Turlin, Andrew Smith, Rivka Brot, Eitan 
Rom, James Wray Miller, Gabriela Morales, members of the legal history workshop at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and members of the legal history workshop at 
Harvard Law School. 
1 MARTIN WOOLLACOTT, AFTER SUEZ: ADRIFT IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY 4 (2006). 
2 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).  
3 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 5 
(2013). 
4 See id. at 222 (“The pattern that the Constitution sets in its war politics is not unique. 
The Constitution does not draw clear boundaries between legislative and executive powers 
in a variety of policy areas.”).  
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
6 ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 21 (“While the Constitution’s allocation of the authority to 
make war seems to call for some important distinctions, war, repelling attack and defensive 
actions are capacious categories whose meaning must be politically constructed.”). 
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The Suez War, a war of choice launched simultaneously by the United 
Kingdom, France, and Israel against the expressed opposition of U.S. president 
Dwight Eisenhower, affected international relations and shaped American 
foreign policy into our own age.7 I briefly review how the constitutional 
regimes of the three countries were mobilized to provide the legal cover for the 
war. I then discuss the constitutional powers used by President Eisenhower to 
thwart the plans of the three countries. The President of the United States was 
not willing to go to war and at the same time invoked his considerable Article 
II powers to subvert the plans of the other three.8 We thus have an interesting 
case of a crisis in international relations: three countries (one small emerging 
nation and two European powers, one of which, Britain, has been a close ally 
of the United States) mobilize their constitutional regimes to launch a war, 
while the fourth country mobilizes its own constitutional regime to undermine 
the war efforts and the gains expected to be reaped by the belligerents. The 
results of these constitutional and political maneuvers had mighty 
consequences for the world as we know it today. 
B. Motives of the Belligerents   
On October 29, 1956, Israel launched war against Egypt by invading the 
Sinai Peninsula.9 Two days later the French and British governments issued an 
ultimatum masked as an appeal to both Egypt and Israel to stay clear ten miles 
of the Suez Canal.10 They then deployed their military forces to occupy the 
 
7 See STEVEN Z. FREIBERGER, DAWN OVER SUEZ (1992) (detailing how the collusion 
between Britain, France, and Israel in the Suez Crisis was a “turning point” in the break 
between the United States and Britain, and further led to the United States’ growing 
involvement in the Middle East). 
8 DAVID A. NICHOLS, EISENHOWER 1956: THE PRESIDENT’S YEAR OF CRISIS -- SUEZ AND 
THE BRINK OF WAR 217-67 (2011) (describing the fervent opposition of President 
Eisenhower to military engagement in Suez and the broad actions taken to compel 
withdrawal, including cessation of economic, military, and financial assistance); see also 
FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 189 (“Upon learning of the Israeli attack Eisenhower was firm 
in his belief that American and British prestige were at stake. He considered it imperative 
for both nations to honor their pledge given to Israel and the Arab states in the spring: 
Western support against outside aggression.”).  
9 Id. at 187 (“After two weeks of Israeli military action designed to suggest an imminent 
attack against Jordan, on October 29, 1956, Israeli paratroopers were dropped deep into the 
Sinai Desert.”).  
10 Id. (“The British reminded the Egyptian government that according to the 1954 Suez 
Canal base agreement they had the right to intervene if Egypt was attacked. Accordingly, on 
October 30 Britain and France delivered an ultimatum calling for an end to the fighting and 
warning Egypt to withdraw to a position ten miles from the canal.” (citation omitted)). The 
ultimatum was termed an appeal out of deference to Israel because, in fact, Israel was a 
partner of these two powers rather than an adversary as Egypt was. An ultimatum is a term 
of art in international law. Avoiding the term was one of the techniques of double speak 
deployed by the European powers. See id. (“Nasser refused, informing the British 
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Canal Zone.11 The United Kingdom and France attempted to regain control of 
the Canal, previously nationalized by Egypt, and simultaneously to orchestrate 
a regime change in Cairo. 
It would be hard to argue that this was a war of self-defense, and therefore 
legitimate under the Charter of the United Nations.12 More plausibly, it was a 
preventive war, aimed at restoring the hegemony of the European powers over 
Egypt and vicariously, over the Middle East.13 Israel was in a somewhat 
different situation. Located in the Middle-East and rejected by its neighbors, it 
harbored legitimate and serious grievances against Egypt: organized terrorist 
raids into its territory from the Gaza strip, Egypt’s closure of the Canal as well 
as the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation, and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (Egypt’s 
leader) inflammatory rhetoric promising the annihilation of the state.14 Still, 
Israeli leaders did understand that while serious, without more these grievances 
could not provide a valid reason to open war.15 Israel’s invasion came as a 
result of an agreement between itself and the two European powers.16 The 
Europeans were looking for a “pretext” to launch a war.17 The plan cooked in 
 
ambassador . . . that ‘since the Israelis were the aggressors . . . the British and French stand, 
consisting of the ultimatum and imminent occupation, was an act of aggression against 
Egyptian rights and dignity and against the Charter of the United Nations.’”). 
11 Id. at 188 (“At dusk on October 31 British and French planes began bombing Egyptian 
positions.”).  
12 See Pnina Lahav, A Small Nation Goes to War: Israel's Cabinet Authorization of the 
1956 War, 15 ISRAEL STUDIES 61, 64 (“Israel was a party to the UN charter, which outlawed 
war except for self-defense or pursuant to UNSC (UN Security Council) approval.”).  
13 See id. at 64-65 (contrasting the Suez War as a “war of aggression” as compared to the 
1948 War of Independence, a war of self-defense).  
14 See id. at 66 (outlining David Ben-Gurion’s casus belli to justify military action, 
which included violations of international resolutions and terrorist raids in Israeli territory 
organized by Egyptian forces). 
15 See id. at 65 (“Clearly, the [Israeli] cabinet was well aware of the nature of the motion 
and its grave international ramifications, and was willing to confront the harsh reality. Even 
those who urged avoiding the terms initiated or preventive war understood that it would 
likely be interpreted as such, and worried about being labeled as aggressors.”). The U.N. 
Charter prohibits wars of aggression and permits only wars of self-defense. But who decides 
which is which? There has never been a consensus about the proper name for the Suez War. 
Most refer to it as “the Suez Crisis.” The British called it “Operation Musketeer.” The 
French called it “L’expedition de Suez.” CHRISTIAN PINEAU, 1956, SUEZ (1976). The Israelis 
call it the “Sinai Campaign” or the Kadesh campaign. The reason is clear: none wanted the 
action to fall under the category of “war” and risk being labeled as violators of the U.N. 
Charter. After all, both England and France were permanent members of the U.N. Security 
Council, charged with ensuring the integrity and normative power of the fledgling 
organization and its Charter, which they themselves helped draft.  
16 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
17 KEITH KYLE, SUEZ 320 (1991) (“[British leaders] insisted that it would be essential for 
Britain that Israel carry out a ‘real act of war,’ so as to avoid any danger of Britain being 
thought aggressor by Commonwealth and Scandinavian friends when she took action in 
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Paris and adopted by London was as follows: Israel would invade the Sinai and 
the United Kingdom and France would pretend to be alarmed and enter the 
fray in order to restore the peace. 
Just three months earlier, in July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s 
charismatic president, had nationalized the Suez Canal, one of the last vestiges 
of colonial power in the Middle East, and a vital maritime connection between 
Asia and the Mediterranean.18 The move alarmed the United Kingdom, the 
 
response. The pretext must be credible.”); see also MICHAEL J. TURNER, BRITISH POWER AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING THE 1950S 227 (2009) (“The Suez crisis had many 
causes, including Britain’s wish to maintain a strong presence in the Middle East, the mutual 
hostility between Britain and Egypt, and the lack of confidence between Britain and the 
United States and Britain and France.”).  
18 The decree offered compensation for shares in accordance with their value on the Paris 
Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the decree. See U.S. Dep’t of 
State, The Suez Canal Problem: July 26-September 22, 1956 30-32 (1956) (“Stockholders 
and holders of founders shares shall be compensated for the ordinary or founders shares they 
own in accordance with the value of the shares shown in the closing quotations of the Paris 
Stock Exchange on the day preceding the effective date of the present law.”). This action cut 
short the concession agreement of 1866, under which the Company had the right to operate 
the Canal until 1968. Id. at 9-16 (delineating the terms of the Convention Between the 
Viceroy of Egypt and the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company). 
 Great Britain, France, and the United States protested that the nationalization violated 
international law and issued a statement on August 2, recognizing Egypt’s general right to 
nationalize, yet maintaining that the international character of the Suez Canal Company 
made it immune from nationalization. Id. at 34-35 (“In 1888 all the Great Powers then 
principally concerned with the international character of the Canal and its free, open and 
secure use without discrimination joined in the Treaty and Convention of Constantinople.”) 
The western powers’ claim relied in large part on the Constantinople Convention of 1888. 
Id. at 16-20 (“Convention Between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez 
Maritime Canal”), which guaranteed the freedom and security of the Canal, and which the 
western powers later alleged had incorporated the Suez Canal Company’s concession. Id. at 
72-73 (“Thus the decree of February 22nd, 1866 certifying the convention of that date 
between the Government of Egypt and the Universal Suez Canal Company has been by 
reference incorporated into and made part of what is called the definite system set up by the 
1888 treaty.”). Egypt argued that it did not violate the Constantinople convention because 
section 14 of the convention provided that “the engagements resulting from the present 
treaty shall not be limited by the duration of the acts of concession of the Universal Suez 
Canal Company.” Id. at 20. Therefore, the guarantee of free navigation would become the 
responsibility of Egypt at the end of the concession. Another argument advanced by the 
western powers was that The Suez Company or the Canal itself had a special international 
status exempting them from Egypt’s jurisdiction or from the general right to nationalize. 
Robert Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private 
International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 771-75 (1957) (“The opponents of 
nationalization apparently argue that even were the right of nationalization not precluded by 
incorporation of the concession into the Constantinople Convention, or by the international 
public character of the Company, it would still be precluded because the 
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dominant colonial power in the Middle East up to and during WWII.19 France 
shared Britain’s concerns, but experienced a more immediate distress: Algeria 
was agitating for independence from French rule, and the Algerian rebels were 
supported and encouraged by Egypt’s government.20 To make matters worse, 
the Cold War was casting a dark shadow over world affairs.21 Nasser had just 
 
‘internationalization’ of the canal waters subjects the canal to continued operation by the 
Company or some other international agency.” (citation omitted)); see also Note, 
Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HARV. L. REV. 480, 485-86 (1957) (“[T]he 
argument has been advanced that, even in the absence of treaty restrictions, there is an 
exception to the general right of a state to nationalize when a utility of vital importance to 
the international community is operated by a private company under a concession.”). 
 Egypt further argued that there was no international legal basis for asserting that such 
right of passage could be guaranteed only by the Company, but Egypt never denied its 
intention to deny Israel the right of free passage. Whether or not the nationalization was 
recognized as valid under international law, Egypt’s offer of compensation was probably 
insufficient under the majority view of the time. See e.g., Delson, supra at 767 (“With 
respect to Egypt's obligation to pay compensation for the Suez Canal nationalization, even if 
it is assumed that the Company was an Egyptian one, its shares were owned by foreigners, 
and hence the states whose citizens owned such shares may assert a claim against Egypt 
under public international law for compensation for the nationalization.”). 
 In addition, the offer of compensation was to be paid only after the foreign assets of the 
company were turned over, which was, from the beginning, unlikely ever to occur. Egypt 
argued, and at least one scholar agreed, that the validity of the nationalization was not 
conditioned on whether legal compensation was provided. See id. at 764 (“The sounder 
view . . . would appear to be that the validity of the nationalization is not conditioned upon 
whether legal, or any, compensation is provided for.”). If the nationalization were found to 
be illegal under international law (e.g., because it violated a treaty), Egypt would have been 
obliged to make full reparation, which may have included expectancy damages. See Note, 
supra at 480 (“Should the matter come in any form before the International Court of Justice 
or an arbitral tribunal, and should it be decided that Egypt's action was illegal, the tribunal 
might require the payment of full expectancy damages rather than the more limited 
compensation that Egypt is now offering.”). What was highly unlikely ever to occur was 
specific reparation, or the return of operational rights to the Suez Canal Company, which is 
presumably why even the U.S. accepted the nationalization as a fait accompli in trying to 
find a way forward at the Users’ Conference. The right of a state to nationalize foreign 
property within its territory was broadly recognized by the mid-1950s, “unless forbidden by 
treaty stipulations, or otherwise violative of international law, as in a discriminatory taking 
or a taking of property or of an entity which is immune from nationalization.” Delson, supra 
at 762. 
19 TURNER, supra note 17, at 229 (noting that the British media accused Nasser of an “act 
international brigandage”).  
20 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 163 (“Angered over Nasser’s increasing presence in 
North Africa, particularly in Algeria, the French saw the nationalization of the canal as an 
opportunity to destroy the Egyptian leader once and for all.” (citation omitted)).  
21 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 30 (“[W]ith the way the ‘cold war’ was developing in 
Europe, the overriding consideration for Britain and the United States was to ensure that, no 
matter how much their analysis of the Palestine situation might differ, they must not find 
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completed a large arms deal with the Soviet Union, a deal which appeared to 
turn Egypt into a major military power in the Middle East, and which gave the 
Soviets an important foothold in the region.22 Britain and France had a history 
of colonization as well as competition for hegemony in the Middle East.23 But 
now they shared grave concerns over the political and economic ramifications 
of rising Arab nationalism under Nasser as well as the possibility of Soviet 
ascent in the region.24 Eager to maintain their status as world powers, Britain 
and France joined forces to reassert their colonial and European hegemony in 
the Middle East.25 
Israel—a small, poor, insecure country created only eight years prior—had 
its independent grievances against Egypt, as mentioned above.26 Egypt was 
Israel’s most powerful nemesis, and Israelis were convinced that a second 
round of war (following the 1948 war of independence) was inevitable given 
Egypt’s ongoing provocations.27 They only wondered when it would happen. 
If it were up to Israel, 1956 would not be the year to start a war, but in Paris 
the French military command had other plans.28 As will be discussed later, 
Israel felt it should take the French offer and accepted the dictated timetable.29 
 
themselves fighting a surrogate war against each other.”).  
22 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 27 (“The arms deal was made public on September 27. 
Egypt would procure Soviet-produced arms from the Czechs, in exchange for Egyptian 
cotton.”); see also TURNER, supra note 17, at 228 (“The West dominated arms supplies to 
the Middle East at this time. If Nasser turned for weapons to the communist bloc there 
would be significant shift in the regional balance of power.”).  
23 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 134 (“Britain and France had owned a controlling 
interest in the Suez Canal Company . . . for decades. . . . Suez was a lifeline for Britain. . . . 
Its closing would bring Britain to its knees.” (citation omitted)).  
24 Id.  
25 Lahav, supra note 12, at 61 (“[I]t became clear that Britain and France were Israel’s 
senior partners, and that the central target of the two colonial powers was to restore their 
hold over the Suez Canal.”).  
26 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
27 MOTTI GOLANI, ISRAEL IN SEARCH OF A WAR: THE SINAI CAMPAIGN, 1955-1956, at ix 
(1998) (“[Israeli military leaders] maintained that Israel’s survival was contingent on its 
defeating Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, in a ‘second round.’ . . . The Israeli army 
considered the outcome of the ‘first round’ in 1948-1949 (Israel’s War of Independence) 
intolerable, a situation Israel could not live with.”).  
28 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 69 (“As Ben-Gurion conceded . . . but for the allies’ 
intervention he would not have entertained the idea of launching war ‘tomorrow.’”).  See 
also Guy Laron, The 1955 Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal, the Egyptian Army, and Israeli 
Intelligence, 63 THE MIDDLE EAST J. 69 (2009).   
29 Id. at 81 n.6 (“Ben-Gurion knew well that his cabinet was skeptical of the idea of war . 
. . . [H]e calculated that the cabinet, facing the decision to “go to war tomorrow” would 
bend to pressure to approve the motion so as not to upset Britain and France . . .”).  
 
1304 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1297 
 
C. U.S. Reaction and Aftermath  
In the context of world affairs the military invasion of Egypt came at a 
particularly inopportune moment. The anxiety over the Cold War was 
escalating as Hungary, behind the Iron Curtain, was signaling its desire to be 
free while the Soviet government was flexing its muscle.30 Amid the gathering 
storm, Dwight Eisenhower was in the final weeks of his campaign to win a 
second term as President of the United States. The United Nations, designed as 
a world government capable of stopping wanton war and barely a decade old, 
was struggling to shape a meaningful role for itself as guardian of the rule of 
international law under the UN Charter. 
On October 31 and following the invasion and ultimatum, President 
Eisenhower did not turn a blind eye as the parties had expected, even though 
the presidential elections were less than a week away.31 Rather, he reacted 
furiously and resolutely, demanding a halt to the aggression and immediate 
withdrawal.32 Even though the Cold War was raging, and for reasons unrelated 
to Eisenhower’s, the Soviet leadership quickly echoed his demands.33 This was 
the only event in the history of the Cold War where the superpowers 
collaborated in denouncing a war and insisted on the return of the status quo 
ante. Meanwhile, Soviet tanks entered Budapest to crush an uprising against 
the Soviet domination of Hungary.34 Thus, the denunciation of the Western 
powers invading Egypt came in the midst of a serious and noisy international 
turmoil about events in Hungary. In New York, Dag Hammerskjöld, Secretary 
General of the United Nations, in full cooperation with Washington, insisted 
on an immediate withdrawal by Israel, France, and Britain from Egyptian 
soil.35 Under the pressure of international sanctions and aggressive diplomatic 
American maneuvers, the three countries reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire and 
to withdrawal from Suez. From this perspective, international law, as it was 
 
30 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 3 (“While the United States emerged from [World War 
II] stronger than its European allies, the Soviet Union’s postwar actions and development of 
atomic weapons intensified American perceptions of a worldwide communist threat. . . . 
This bundle of tensions had spawned a ‘Cold War’ almost immediately after the big war.”).  
31 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 209-15 (outlining Eisenhower’s “emphatic protest” to 
the British-French ultimatum); see also Lahav, supra note 12, at 74 (noting the belief that 
the United States would be distracted by the upcoming Presidential election).  
32 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 209-15.  
33 Id. at 208 (“[T]he British and the French vetoed the American-sponsored Security 
Council resolution calling for a cease-fire between Israel and Egypt. Ironically, the Soviet 
Union supported the measure.”).  
34 Id. at xx (“The morning of November 4, the Soviet Union had sent 200,000 troops and 
four thousand tanks into Budapest, Hungary, to put down a revolt.”).  
35 Id. at 247 (detailing the demands from the United Nations that “Britain, France and 
Israel implement a cease-fire within twelve hours and withdraw from Egypt within three 
days or be faced with the prospect of American and Soviet military assistance”). The veto 
powers of Britain and France in the U.N. Security Council were of no avail as the United 
States moved the deliberations to the General Assembly. 
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embedded in the UN Charter, prevailed.36 But the history of the Cold War and 
that of the Middle East shows that, in fact, the aftermath of these events were 
replete with much violence and very little rule of law. In more than one way, 
Suez was a war to make more wars. 
The big losers of the Suez adventure were the United Kingdom and 
France.37 Both had to abandon their dreams of restoring their colonial glory. 
Among other things, they turned their energy towards the idea of a united 
Europe.38 Israel, like its collaborators, also had to withdraw from Egyptian soil, 
and in this sense its military victory also turned into a diplomatic defeat.39 But 
unlike its senior collaborators, Israel also emerged with a few substantial gains 
in hand. The Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt to Israeli navigation were now 
opened for all;40 the first international UN force was created and placed in the 
Sinai Peninsula as a buffer between Egypt and Israel;41 and Israel began to 
attract attention and recognition for its military capabilities.42 
I. THREE COUNTRIES (PLUS ONE) GO TO WAR:  
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS 
A. Egypt 
 
1.  Constitutional Framework  
 
 
36 Id.  
37 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 549 (denoting British Prime Minister Anthony Eden the 
“loser” of Suez); GOLANI, supra note 27, at 187 (“British policy in the Middle East had 
sustained a series of humiliations in the early 1950s . . .”); MORDECHAI BAR-ON, THE GATES 
OF GAZA: ISRAEL’S ROAD TO SUEZ AND BACK, 1955-1957, 321 (1994) (“France emerged 
from the war utterly defeated; its position as a world power had been seriously assailed and 
its control of North Africa was ultimately lost.”).  
38 BRUNO LEPRINCE, CHRISTIAN PINEAU DE BUCHENWALD AUX TRAITES DE ROME 107 
(2004).  
39 See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 191 (“The Israeli withdrawal . . . was preceded by a 
general decline in the euphoria which prevailed in Israeli during the war . . . . [T]he 
downfall was swift and hard, and completely incomprehensible to anyone who was not 
privy to the legions of secrets which surrounded this war.”).  
40 Id. at 197 (“The Straits of Tiran were open to Israeli navigation and remained open 
until May 1967.”); see BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 320 (“The withdrawal from the Straits of 
Tiran was made conditional on formal guarantees ensuring its freedom of navigation . . .”).  
41 See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 196-99 (stating that the “tranquility along Israel’s 
border with Egypt” was due at least in part to “the presence of UN peacekeeping forces,” 
and further explaining that “with the exception of Nasser’s downfall, Israel emerged with 
everything it wanted”).  
42 Id. at 196 (“Generally speaking, Israel’s value as a strategic asset in the Middle East 
was at last recognised by the West.”).   
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Though Egypt was the target of attack by Britain, France, and Israel, it is 
worthwhile to take a look at the Egyptian political and constitutional scene 
before discussing the three countries that initiated military engagement in 
Suez. Egypt deliberately took that fateful step of nationalizing the Suez Canal 
that within six months culminated in a war. What were the constitutional 
mechanisms that led Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal, thus setting in 
motion the events precipitating the Suez conflict? 
Egypt’s modern history was dominated by British colonial presence, with 
strategic British military bases established on Egyptian soil as early as the late 
19th century.43 This state of affairs was fortified by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
of Alliance of 1936, which resulted in the presence of up to 80,000 British 
military personnel in Egypt.44 
Until 1952 Egypt was a monarchy with a liberal constitution modeled after 
the Belgian constitution. In July 1952, a group of Egyptian military officers 
overthrew the King and established Egyptian military rule.45  Of these officers 
the most charismatic and ambitious was Gamal Abdel Nasser. By 1954 he 
appointed himself prime minister and by 1956 he introduced a new constitution 
stipulating a one party rule in Egypt. In the June 1956 elections he was the 
only candidate for president and won by a resounding landslide.46 Now Nasser 
was in full control of both domestic and foreign affairs. Soon he would become 
leader of the Arab world and a welcomed figure among the non-aligned 
nations.47 Nasser harbored considerable hostility against the Western powers, 
especially against Britain. He often spoke of a “hateful trinity” comprised of 
“social injustice, political oppression, and British occupation.”48 
 
2.  The Road to War 
 
The decision to nationalize the canal was met with a wave of enthusiastic 
support in Egypt as well as in the larger Arab world.49 From the perspective of 
 
43 KIRK J. BEATTIE, EGYPT DURING THE NASSER YEARS: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY 18 (1994) (“Great Britain’s occupation began in 1882, and although Egypt gained 
formal independence in 1922, the continued presence of British administrative advisers and 
troops severely curtailed Egyptian sovereignty.”).  
44 JAMES JANKOWSKI, NASSER’S EGYPT, ARAB NATIONALISM, AND THE UNITED ARAB 
REPUBLIC 12 (2002) (“The British position was put on a more formal basis in 1936 with the 
conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance that linked Egypt and Great Britain in a 
twenty-year alliance, thereby regularizing but also perpetuating the positioning of British 
military forces in Egypt.”).  
45 See id. at 14-19 (describing the “Free Officers Movement” which overthrew the 
monarchy and became the governing authority in Egypt in 1952).  
46 See id. at 65-70 (describing Nasser’s ascent to political power).  
47 See id.  
48 See id. at 42. 
49 Id. (“Nasser’s announcement . . . stunned but also electrified the huge crowd present at 
his addresss; he received a spontaneous ovation, which in the view of one observer reached 
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constitutional design, the important point was that Nasser’s decision was 
unitary. He did not consult any other institution in Egypt, including his own 
cabinet.50 Even the Egyptian Foreign Minister was not consulted.51 Thus this 
decision, which constituted the single event triggering the War of 1956 and 
which was characterized as the “most dramatic [Egyptian] foreign policy 
decision of the mid 1950’s,”52 was taken by one man, with neither checks nor 
balances. Egypt’s rulers made many statements concerning their devotion to 
the [Arab, Egyptian] public interest and their commitment to the welfare of the 
people.53 They also enjoyed considerable popular support.54 But Egypt’s rulers 
were new in their job—Nasser seized power the same year—and Egypt had no 
tradition of parliamentary rule and little solid administrative law to channel and 
process political decisions.55 The actual decision to nationalize and thereafter 
to escalate the diplomatic confrontation, even to risk war, was made by Gamal 
Abdel Nasser alone, rather speedily and without collective deliberation.56 
Would the war have taken place without Nasser’s nationalization of the 
canal? Perhaps. France and Israel had independent reasons to unsettle Nasser. 
Still, France was eager to have Britain on its side, and it is very questionable 
whether Britain would have gone to war if nationalization did not take place. 
Following WWII, the Suez War was the first instance in which Britain acted in 
opposition to an express U.S. wish in such critical matters as war and peace.57 
It is doubtful that Prime Minister Anthony Eden would have taken such an 
unconventional step if he did not believe that the challenge to the British 
national interest should be squarely met.58 
 
‘hysteria levels.’” (citation omitted)).  
50 Id. (“The later testimony of Nasser’s associates is unanimous in that the most dramatic 
foreign policy decision of the mid-1950’s, the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 
1956, was Nasser’s decision alone, revealed to the cabinet only to the surprise, and in some 
cases, the consternation of its members.”).  
51 Id. (“Foreign Minister Mahmud Fawzi was a ‘respected technician’ who had ‘only a 
small role as policy maker.’”).  
52 Id. at 67.  
53 See BEATTIE, supra note 43, at 117 (describing Arab nationalism as a “key ideal of the 
Nasser regime”).  
54 See id. at 116 (“[The] assertion of national independence and open defiance of the 
[West] . . . earned Nasser tremendous popularity in Egypt and the Arab world. Indeed, his 
spurning of Western threats with his own verbal taunts sent much of the public into gleeful 
delirium.”).  
55 See id. at 142 (describing the implementation of new policies as an exercise of 
“learning by trial and error”).  
56 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.  
57 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, 159-86 (outlining the deteroriation of the Anglo-
American alliance); W. SCOTT LUCAS, DIVIDED WE STAND (1991). 
58 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 161 (“The British reaction to nationalization of the 
canal was predictable. After meeting with American and French officials, Eden immediately 
summoned his cabinet. They characterized Nasser’s act as a callous betrayal of the Suez 
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B. The United Kingdom 
 1. Constitutional Framework  
Historically, the monarchic constitutional structure of England has 
democratized, providing for checks and balances, popular representation, and a 
growing awareness of the need for political and civil liberties.59 However, this 
structure has left intact matters of foreign affairs and particularly of war 
powers. Issues related to war have been long recognized as royal prerogatives, 
solidly vested in the hands of the executive (the crown).60 This was precisely 
the model that the framers of the U.S Constitution decided to reject.61 The 
British arrangement contained several implicit assumptions further highlighted 
through a brief comparison with the American constitutional model: 
1. As long as the prerogative was not superseded by statute, the 
executive had the complete power to launch a war without 
consulting Parliament or any of its committees.62 
2. The presumption was that the sovereign acted in the public interest, 
i.e., “for the honour and interest of the nation” and not for 
“inglorious or improper” reasons.63 The guarantee to ensure that the 
 
Canal base treaty and an intolerable threat to Western economic interests.”). But note, too, 
that Eden was quite ill and probably unable to manage soberly the affairs of state. See id. at 
177 (“By the beginning of October Eden had reached his physical breaking point. After two 
years of intense pressure from a myriad of crisis situations, the Suez problem may have put 
him over the edge.”). 
59 See PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 1-4 (2012).  
60 1 HERBERT BROOM, EDWARD HADLEY & SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 200 (1875) (“[T]he sovereign has . . . the sole prerogative of 
making war and peace.”).  
61 See YASUO HASEBE, War Powers, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 468 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) (“[T]he Founders 
clearly intended to divorce the power to initiate war from the power to prosecute it, and 
hence, endorsed a limited commander in chief power.”). The power vested was to “declare 
war,” not to “make war.” The framers recognized that if the country were attacked, and 
therefore the war was a war of self-defense, time would be of the essence, and consultation 
with the legislative branch not necessarily feasible. However, they thought that when it 
comes to aggressive war, or a war of choice, the decision should be taken the legislative 
branch to ensure appropriate deliberations and collective responsibility. This arrangement 
was put in place despite, or maybe because of, its size (bicameral, quite slow to make 
decisions). We know that this model has not worked very well, and the executive has been 
quite dominant, in making the decision to go to war. The War Powers Act was meant to 
structure this situation and restore the balance between Congress and the President, but the 
most recent experience in Libya shows that this has not been that simple. 
62 See id. at 466 (“The United Kingdom exemplifies the state in which war powers are 
vested solely in the executive. That the British Parliament has no formal role in the 
deployment of the armed forces makes the United Kingdom exceptional among 
contemporary democracies.”).  
63 BROOM ET AL., supra note 60, at 201 (“[T]he same check of parliamentary 
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sovereign indeed intended to pursue the public interest resided in 
the process of Parliamentary impeachment or in a parliamentary 
vote of no confidence (see below).64 
3. Like their American counterparts, British commentators recognized 
the distinction between “making war” and “declaring war,” but their 
theory justifying the distinction was different. In England, a 
declaration of war served “not so much that the enemy may be put 
upon his guard (which is a matter rather of magnanimity than right), 
as that it may be certainly clear that the war is undertaken not by 
private persons, but by the will of the whole community.”65 Again, 
the premise was that the executive branch was pursuing the public 
interest and was articulating the “voice of the people.” 
4. Unlike the United States, where a strict separation of powers 
obtained, and the president served his full term regardless of the 
level of Congressional support, the British executive drew its 
legitimacy from the support of Parliament. The mechanism to 
control an executive decision to go to war was a parliamentary vote 
of no-confidence in the cabinet. The expectation was that the 
cabinet would take Parliamentary opinion into account prior to 
taking a decision to go to war. 
5. The British constitutional system provides that the cabinet is 
collectively beholden to Parliament; in contrast, the U.S. President 
embodies the executive branch, and the cabinet has no formal 
constitutional power or responsibility.66 
 
2.  The Road to War  
 
What precipitated the British decision to attack Egypt in late 1956 and try to 
reassert its prominent role in the Canal Zone? The Suez Canal was constructed 
between 1858 and 1869, and following its completion was operated by the 
 
impeachment, for improper or inglorious conduct, in beginning, conducting, or concluding a 
national war, is in general sufficient to restrain the ministers of the crown from a wanton or 
injurious exertion of this great prerogative.”).   
64 See Jenny S. Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 468 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012) 
(“In parliamentary systems, the prime minister typically may be removed during office by a 
no-confidence vote in the legislature, while in a presidential system the president’s tenure in 
office does not depend on legislative support.”).  
65 BROOM ET AL., supra note 60, at 201 (emphasis added).   
66 See Martinez, supra note 64, at 553 (“[I]n a presidential system, the president is 
independent of the legislature, and indeed may be from a different political party than the 
majority of the legislature. In a parliamentary system, on the other hand, whichever party or 
coalition of parties controls the legislature also controls the executive branch.”).  
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Suez Canal Company.67 In the beginning, the company’s shares were owned 
by French and Egyptian investors, but later the British government (under 
Disraeli’s tenure as prime minister) purchased 40% of the shares and became a 
major investor.68 At the time that Nasser nationalized the Canal, two-thirds of 
Europe’s oil was passing through that waterway.69 While the nationalization 
was perceived as a bold defiance of the already fading colonial world order, it 
was also viewed as placing in jeopardy the smooth supply of oil to Europe, oil 
vital to the European economy.70 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden considered military action as soon as 
he received news of Nasser’s decision to nationalize the canal.71 Eden ordered 
his military command to prepare contingency plans for the restoration of the 
status quo ante.72 Simultaneously, Eden established an Egypt Committee 
within the cabinet to monitor the crisis and make recommendations to the 
Cabinet.73 From the British constitutional perspective, Eden’s Cabinet had the 
authority to decide to launch war against Egypt; the establishment of the Egypt 
Committee was a step in this direction. 
The jurisdiction of the Egypt Committee extended to military efforts as well 
as diplomatic negotiations (spurred by the United States) to resolve the matter 
through peaceful means.74 Eden used his prerogative as Prime Minister to 
 
67 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 12 (detailing the creation of the Suez Canal).  
68 Id. at 12-14.  
69 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 251 n.2 (“Of the total of seventy million tons of oil 
which passed from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal, sixty million tons were 
destined for Western Europe and represented two-thirds of its oil supplies.”). 
70 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 44 (1991) (“[The Canal’s] importance as an international 
waterway . . . increased with the development of the oil industry and the dependence of the 
world on oil supplies.”). This context is further complicated by the Cold War, where the 
West suspected the Soviet Union of supporting Nasser and attempting to gain economic 
leverage against (or even to smother) Western Europe and Britain. See id. at 50 (discussing 
the effect of Moscow’s weapons sales to Egypt on Western policy). Indeed, oil was the 
weapon Eisenhower used to force Britain to withdraw from the canal region. See infra Part 
“United States.”   
71 But the UK had been contemplating military action against Egypt since the spring of 
1956.  LUCAS, supra note 57, at 97 (stating that in March 1956, Eden “spoke of Egypt as ‘the 
main threat to [British] interests’ in Iraq and the Persian Gulf”). 
72 Colin Seymour-Ure, British ‘War Cabinets’ in Limited Wars: Korea, Suez and the 
Falklands, 62 PUB. ADMIN. 181, 184 (1984) (explaining that while the crisis was still 
diplomatic at this point, Eden consulted the Chief of Staff). 
73 Id. (“The Egypt Committee was set up by the Cabinet on the morning after Nasser 
nationalized the Canal.”). The idea of a ‘war cabinet’ within the larger cabinet was modeled 
after Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s WWII administration. See id. at 182 (describing 
the failure of larger cabinets to “run wars” and the success of the specialists on Churchill’s 
WWII War Cabinet).   
74 Id. at 191-92 (stating the work of the Egypt Committee included discussing economic 
sanctions and making “arrangements for a conference of maritime nations”). 
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handpick the members of the Egypt Committee on an ad hoc basis and also to 
change the membership as he saw fit.75 Thus, the Egypt Committee could not 
develop a consistent or a coherent view of the crisis but was rather used as a 
springboard for Prime Minister Eden’s developing policy.76 In other words, the 
Egypt Committee could neither function as a bona fide check and balance on 
Prime Minister Eden’s policies, nor could it ensure meaningful deliberations. 
The final decision to invade Egypt and orchestrate a coup replacing Nasser 
with a president more sympathetic to the colonial powers, and regain control of 
the Canal, was taken by Prime Minister Eden without the benefit of too much 
consultation.77 That does not mean that members of the Cabinet did not have 
views and disagreements. The Minister of Defense, Walter Monckton, resigned 
a few weeks before the attack because he opposed military measures.78 Others 
had their doubts but decided to keep their views to themselves.79 Eden did not 
seek out legal counsel in the initial stages of the process because Eden 
considered the matter purely political and unencumbered by a legal 
dimension.80 
Eden was swayed when, in mid-October, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet 
and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, persuaded Eden that the 
military option was preferable to negotiations, and that the two European 
powers should use Israel to provide a pretext for an attack.81 Eden did not feel 
 
75 Id. at 184 (suggesting that characterizing the Egypt Committee as a single, well 
defined entity is misleading). 
76 Id. at 185 (describing the fluctuating membership of the Egypt Committee as has 
having political significance because its fluctuating membership strengthened Prime 
Minister Eden’s “personal position”). 
77 See id. at 184-85. Eden was one of the brave politicians who opposed the Munich 
agreement between Prime Minister Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler. See LUCAS, supra note 
57, at 23 (explaining that Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary in 1938 and aligned himself 
with opponents of appeasement). As Eden faced Nasser’s violation of Egypt’s agreement 
with Britain, he thought of Nasser as the new Mussolini, if not the new Hitler. Id. This 
assumption fed his determination to resist Nasser’s nationalization. This view could be 
interpreted as tunnel vision, an act of “fighting the last war.” Id. 
78 Id. at 254 (explaining that Monckton resigned because he “believed the use of force 
against Egypt would be a ‘great blunder’”). 
79 See id. at 249 (“A dissenter could have resigned, at the cost of his career.”). 
80 Evidently, Eden did not doubt his constitutional power to launch the war. What Eden 
was trying to avoid was the effect of international law on the question of the legality of the 
war. For example, Eden objected to the briefing of the Foreign Office Legal Adviser, Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, saying: “That’s the last person I want consulted. The lawyers are 
always against our doing anything. For God’s sake, keep them out of it. This is a political 
affair.” Id. at 238. For a different view, see D.R. THORPE, EDEN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF 
ANTHONY EDEN, FIRST EARL OF AVON, 1897-1977 (2004).   
81 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 239 (stating that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Lloyd, made a “final attempt to save negotiations with Egypt,” but the French found this 
“quite unsatisfactory”). 
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he needed the approval of his cabinet. He called his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, to return from New York (where he was attending the 
United Nations sessions and negotiating a deal with the Egyptians) and sent 
him to France to finalize war plans.82 
Present at the top-secret meeting were French Prime Minister Guy Mollet 
and his Ministers of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s Prime 
Minister David Ben Gurion (who also served as Minister of Defense), his 
Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres, Director General of the 
Ministry of Defense. 83 A contract (“Sèvre Protocol”) was hurriedly negotiated, 
typed (by the only woman present, a secretary) and signed by Britain, France, 
and Israel.84 In the Sèvre Protocol, Israel’s Prime Minister Ben-Gurion 
committed Israel to engage in “acts of war” against Egypt, thereby providing 
the British and French governments a pretext to issue an ultimatum to both 
Israel and Egypt (thus maintaining the appearance of even-handedness) and 
shortly thereafter launch their war on Egypt.85 The ultimatum amounted to a 
decision to launch a war because it was clear that war would follow; because 
Egypt was not expected to obey the ultimatum.86 The record shows that a few 
key ministers deliberated the proposal to go to war, but that Prime Minister 
Eden dominated the process and his will prevailed.87 
On October 25, the British envoys returned from Paris and Prime Minister 
Eden assembled his cabinet.88 Eden presented the plan of attack, disclosing that 
an Israeli attack was expected, but did not reveal the full content of the Sèvre 
Protocol.89 The inner circle of cabinet ministers voted in favor of the plan and 
 
82 Id. at 239 (discussing Lloyd’s return from New York and the subsequent trip to Paris 
to negotiate with the French). 
83 See Seymour-Ure; supra note 72, at 192 (describing the membership of meetings that 
led to “Anglo-French-Israeli collusion”).  
84 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 247 (describing the contents of the Sèvre Protocol and 
stating that the document “called for the endorsement of ‘the three governments’”). See also 
Avi Shlain, The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot, 73 INT’L AFF. 509 
(1997).   
85 See id. (“The British and French agreed that if Israel attacked Egypt, they would 
intervene ‘to protect the Canal.’”); IZHAK BAR-ON, “AN UMBRELLA IN A RAINY DAY . . .” 
FRENCH-ISRAELI SECURITY RELATIONS, 1948-1956 at 548-51 (2010) (reproducing the Sèvre 
Protocol). 
86 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 247 (describing the Egyptian refusal as “inevitable”). 
87 See Seymour-Ure, supra note 72, at 191-93 (describing the Egypt Committee as a 
“partial Cabinet” led by Eden that often times made decisions without prior discussion with 
the full cabinet). 
88 Id. at 192 (“The Cabinet agreed with the recommendation to intervene with the French 
in the event of an Israeli attack.”). 
89 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (suggesting that Eden refrained from mentioning the 
Sèvre Protocol in order to “minimise the possibility of division within the Cabinet”). But see 
THORPE, supra note 80 (writing that Eden did disclose the fact of the Protocol to his 
cabinet).  
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the rest followed suit.90 At this stage, legal advice concerning the perspective 
of international law was sought, but Eden avoided his own Attorney General 
and instead commissioned a memorandum from the head of the Judiciary, 
whom he knew would support his position.91 The process was honored but 
substance was lacking. 
On October 30, 1956, following the Israeli invasion of the Sinai, Prime 
Minister Eden led his cabinet to invoke the royal prerogative and issue an 
ultimatum/appeal to Egypt and Israel in behalf of Her Majesty, the Queen.92 
The ultimatum presented the British attack as a means to restore the peace 
rather than as an aggressive act meant to achieve regime change. The story 
both Eden and Mollet hoped the world would buy was that the Israeli 
“surprise” conquest of the Sinai threatened the operations of the Suez Canal 
and therefore necessitated British and French intervention to restore peace.93 
What was planned behind closed doors as a preventive war, a war of choice, 
was to be presented to the public as a peace-loving intervention. The British 
cabinet viewed Eden’s announcement as a fait accompli and approved the 
measure.94 
At four-thirty in the afternoon, accompanied by Secretary of the Foreign 
Office Selwyn Lloyd, Prime Minister Anthony Eden entered the House of 
Commons and announced the issuance of the British-French ultimatum.95 The 
 
90 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (“Given the agreement between senior ministers to 
proceed, Monckton [the former Minister of Defense] and other junior Ministers could not 
upset Eden’s strategy. A dissenter could have resigned, at the cost of his career, but, as of 25 
October, he had no cause to present to the Commons or to the public.”). 
91 In 2006, declassified British documents revealed further manipulation of the 
constitutional process by Prime Minister Eden in order to secure the approval of his cabinet. 
Instead of requesting the advice of Attorney General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, as 
was the norm in matters related to foreign affairs, Eden requested Lord Kilmuir, the Lord 
Chancellor (or head of the judiciary), to craft a memorandum justifying the war under 
international law. Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The 
Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 773, 777 (1988) 
(stating that Lord Kilmuir believed the United Kingdom was legally entitled to use military 
force against Egypt as a form of self-defense). 
92 The ultimatum to Israel was a part of the collusion between the three countries. See 
supra text note 85. Israel expected the ultimatum and, in any event, was in no need of being 
warned, as Israel had been encouraged to invade Egypt by the U.K. and France.  
93 See 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1275 (U.K.) (“[A]ny fighting on the banks 
of the Canal would endanger the ships actually on passage.”); LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 
(describing intervention as a means to “prevent interference with the free flow of traffic 
through the Canal”). 
94 Seymour-Ure, supra note 72, at 192 (discussing the full cabinet’s approval of the war 
measure). At the meeting of the full cabinet authorizing the war ultimatum leading to the 
British invasion, Eden is supposed to have said, “A lot of my present colleagues never 
served in a War Cabinet,” to which one of the ministers retorted, “We didn’t know we were 
at war.” Id. at 185. 
95 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1275 (U.K.) (“Her Majesty’s Government and 
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Sèvre Protocol was not mentioned.96 A lively debate ensued, led by members 
of the opposition Labour Party who vigorously criticized the fact that 
Parliament was not consulted.97 Still, the House of Commons supported Eden 
by fifty-two votes.98 
From the perspective of constitutional design, the striking fact is that there 
was no constitutional process of checks and balances and no mechanism in 
place to assess the pros and cons of Eden’s decision to go to war. It is one 
thing to vest the decision to go to war in the executive branch. It is quite 
another to avoid the administrative mechanisms within the executive branch 
designed to provide assessment and quality control. Additionally, Eden made 
sure that the civil service at the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, and 
the Treasury Department were not informed of the impending actions.99 Also, 
Eden’s Egypt Committee was not encouraged to voice dissent. Not subjected 
to challenging input, Eden also persuaded himself that the United States, while 
unhappy, would go along with Britain’s actions.100 After all, the United 
Kingdom was a loyal ally, the Cold War was raging, and Washington was well 
aware of Nasser’s flirtation with the Soviets and considered Nasser a menace 
to world order. Significantly, Eden also assumed that the structure of the 
United Nations would play into his hands. The United Kingdom had a veto 
power at the UN Security Council and a British veto, he calculated, would 
prevent an escalation of the conflict. As we shall see, Washington’s reaction 
surprised Eden and dramatically upset his expectations. Had Eden allowed his 
cabinet and upper echelons of the civil service to brainstorm the war plans 
freely, he may well have anticipated some of the developments that eventually 
brought about his demise. 
3. Aftermath: Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers   
In the 21st Century the United Kingdom began rethinking the royal 
prerogative in the context of proper governance. In 2011, the Cabinet Manual 
“pointed out that the Coalition government had in 2011 ‘acknowledged that a 
 
the French Government have accordingly agreed that everything possible should be done to 
bring hostilities to an end as soon as possible.”). 
96 Eden continually denied any “collusion” between the UK, France and Israel. See 
LUCAS, supra note 57, at 248 (explaining that Eden “instructed Dean and Logan to return to 
Paris to destroy all copies of the agreement”).  
97 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) 1283 (U.K.) (expressing concern that members 
of the House “may be denied the opportunity” to express their views on the issue). 
98 The vote was 270:218 (listing “ayes” and “noes”). See 558 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 
(1956) 1377-82 (U.K).  
99 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 249 (stating that Eden “limited the details of Sèvres to an 
inner circle of Ministers”).  
100 TURNER, supra note 17 at 264-65 (suggesting that Eden “underestimated the influence 
of Eisenhower” on United States’ foreign policy). 
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convention had developed in Parliament that before troops were committed the 
House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter . . . .’”101 
In 2003 Prime Minister Tony Blair requested Parliamentary approval for 
ensuring “the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”102 
Thereafter, Parliament deliberated the need to restructure the royal prerogative, 
 
101 MARK RYAN & STEVE FOSTER, UNLOCKING CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
280 (Rourtledge ed., 3d ed. 2014) (discussing the use of the United Kingdom’s military 
abroad). Clare Short, MP, submitted a private member bill in 2005 that led to the 
crystallization of the convention. See id. at 280 (explaining the rationale behind the bill as 
the need to ensure decisions to use the military were “effectively scrutinized”); THE 
GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN: WAR POWERS AND TREATIES: LIMITING EXECTUTIVE POWERS, 2007, 
CP26/07, at 24-58 (U.K.) (discussing the issues involved in deploying armed forces abroad). 
The Report explores the question of whether “new arrangements should be contained in a 
freestanding convention, or in a resolution of the House, or in legislation?” Id. at 3. The 
report also contains a brief survey of the constitutional arrangements from a comparative 
perspective. Id. at 66-68 (detailing parliamentary involvement in decisions to deploy troops 
in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
States). See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN – CONSTITUTIONAL 
RENEWAL, 2008, Cm. 7342-I (U.K.); HASEBE, supra note 61 at 466-68 (comparing the 
process of mobilizing troops in the United Kingdom with the process in the United States). 
In the late 20th century the British government continued to deploy the prerogative but the 
Suez experience made it more sensitive to the political and legal ramifications of its 
decisions. See 2 SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE FALKLANDS 
CAMPAIGN 21-9 (2005) (recounting the various stages of the British war in the Falklands in 
1982, in which much attention was invested in governance procedures and legal advice). 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not seek the explicit authorization of Parliament for 
the armed conflict in the Falklands and yet she did enjoy Parliamentary support since the 
early days of the crisis. See id. at 19 (“With the Labour leadership’s support, and from the 
centre parties as well, there was no serious organized opposition in Parliament to sending 
the Task Force.”). In accordance with previous custom, Thatcher established a war cabinet. 
Id. at 21 (describing the War Cabinet as “the critical instrument of crisis management”). The 
Foreign Office’s legal counsel advised the Government that British action would amount to 
a war of self-defense. Id. at 90 (explaining the legality behind the British decision to declare 
war). Furthermore, the United Kingdom secured support from the United Nations Security 
Council. Id. at 43 (“The Security Council . . . Determining that there exists a breach of the 
peace in the region of the Falkland Islands . . . Demands an immediate withdrawal of All 
Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands.”).  Additionally, there was close consultation 
with the United States as well as with other Western powers. Id. at 157 (describing the 
United States’ role in helping to find a “peaceful solution”). As expected, “Suez . . . [was] 
the constant reference point on how not to manage great crises.” Id. at 26. “[The] Suez 
Debacle [was] a powerful memory for all those contemplating the way in which such 
ventures [could] go horribly wrong.” Id. at 93. Additionally, the British Government did not 
seek Parliamentary authorization for the military intervention in Yugoslavia (1999) nor in 
Afghanistan. HASEBE, supra at 467 (stating that it has not been general practice to ask for 
parliamentary permission to deploy military forces).  
102 401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2003) 760 (U.K.) (stating that “it is right that the 
House debate this issue and pass judgment”).  
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recognizing that it was an antiquated constitutional arrangement in need of 
democratic reform.103 A 2004 House of Commons report recommended 
legislation that would require Parliamentary authorization prior to the 
deployment of forces.104 A 2006 House of Lords report recommended a softer 
version. The House of Lords report proposed a parliamentary convention, 
formalized by a House of Commons resolution, but not legislation.105 
 In 2007, Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s Government issued a Green Paper 
titled “The Governance of Britain,” endorsing the House of Lords’ 
recommendations and conceding that the royal prerogative was outdated.106 
Brown lost power 2010. So far, Prime Minister David Cameron’s Government 
has not pushed forward any legislation, but has followed the practice of 
consulting Parliament introduced by Tony Blair in 2003, thereby conceding the 
emergence of a constitutional convention.107 In August 2013, Prime Minister 
Cameron brought a motion to Parliament asking for the endorsement of the 
introduction of United Kingdom’s forces into hostilities in Syria. The motion 
failed 285-272 and Cameron proceeded to assure Parliament that he would not 
use military action in Syria under the royal prerogative before another vote in 
the Commons.108 It has been suggested that a convention modifying the 
 
103 401 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2003) 760 (U.K.) (characterizing parliamentary 
debate as “the democracy that is our right”). 
104 PUB. ADMIN. SELECT COMM., TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING 
MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO PARLIAMENT, 2003-4, H.C. 422, at 31-33 (U.K.) 
(suggesting a draft bill that would “require Parliament’s approval to be obtained for the 
exercise of certain [executive powers]”). 
105 SELECT COMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, WAGING WAR: PARLIAMENT’S ROLE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, 2005-6, H.L 263-I, at 26-38 (U.K.) (describing possible methods for 
increase Parliament’s involvement in the decision to deploy forces). The Committee’s very 
thoughtful report recommended that parliamentary approval be sought prior to engagement 
in military conflicts, specifying that the Government should provide to Parliament “the 
deployment’s objectives, its legal basis, likely duration and, in general terms, an estimation 
of its size.” Id. at 43. 
106 THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN, 2007, at 19 (U.K.) (“The Government will propose 
that the House of Commons develop a parliamentary convention that could be formalised by 
a resolution. In parallel, it will give further consideration to the option of legislation.”). The 
March 2008 report, “The Governance of Britain - Constitutional Renewal,” includes the 
Government’s recommendations, and presents a Draft Detailed War Powers Resolution. 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN – CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL, 2008, 
Cm. 7342-I, at 50 (U.K.) (“While not ruling out legislation in the future, the Government 
believes that a detailed resolution is the best way forward.”).  
107 In 2011, Cameron’s Foreign Secretary committed to “enshrine in law for the future 
the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action.” POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM COMMITTEE PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN CONFLICT DECISIONS: AN UPDATE, 2013, H.C., 
available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpolcon/649/64903.htm.   
108 Syria crisis: Cameron loses Commons vote on Syria action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23892783 (detailing Parliament’s rejection of 
  
2015] THE SUEZ CRISIS 1317 
 
prerogative has been solidified and that future United Kingdom Governments 
are likely to seek Parliament’s consent prior to any military action.109  
C. France 
1. Constitutional Framework     
France emerged from the Second World War demoralized, even angry. The 
grim and hasty defeat of its military forces as well as the experience of the 
Vichy regime bore hard on its people. The Fourth Republic, inaugurated after 
the liberation, was unstable and ungrounded.110 The Fourth Republic’s 
constitution placed the locus of political power in the National Assembly and 
expected the representatives of the people to closely monitor executive 
actions.111 The cabinet (“Conseil de Ministres”) was headed by a prime 
minister (“President de Conseuil”) approved by and accountable to the 
National Assembly.112 Through the 1950s, the French were not only trying to 
recover from the trauma of World War II, but were also confronting the 
intractable political questions of the current moment: What should be done 
about Inodochina, hitherto a French colony? How should the French think 
about Algeria? Was Algeria indeed “French soil,” or did it belong to the 
Algerian people?113 These questions, in addition to contentious social and 
 
a motion to introduce military forces into Syria and Cameron’s “ruling out” of “joining US-
led strikes”); RYAN & FOSTER, supra note 101, at 280 (explaining Prime Minister 
Cameron’s promise not to deploy military forces in Syria before another vote).  
109 Further reports by the House of Commons’ Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee (“PCRC”) and the House of Lords’ Constitution Committee repeated the 
recommendations of the 2004 and 2006 reports by the same institutions. See Catherine 
Haddon, Parliament, the Royal Prerogative and decisions to go to war, INSTITUTE FOR 
GOVERNMENT (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/6589/parliament-the-royal-prerogative-and-
decisions-to-go-to-war/ (“A strong political convention has therefore been set. It will be 
politically very difficult for governments . . . to take significant military action without clear 
(and potentially prior) approval from Parliament.”). 
110 See generally GEORGETTE ELGEY, HISTORE DE LA IVE RÉPUBLIQUE (1954-1959) 
(1992).  
111 MAURICE DUVERGER, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES 286 (1982) 
(reproducing the Fourth Republic’s constitution); 1946 CONST. 7 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-
constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946-ive-republique.5109.html (stating that the 
executive could not declare war without a vote of the National Assembly). 
112 1946 CONST. 45-48 (Fr.), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1946-
ive-republique.5109.html (describing the relationship between the Council of Ministers, the 
Prime Minister, and the National Assembly). 
113 See generally ELGEY, supra note 110 (cataloging the history and issues of the Fourth 
Republic). 
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political issues, led to severe instability. One government after another fell as a 
result of the National Assembly’s dissatisfaction and votes of no confidence.114 
In the twelve years from 1946, when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated, 
to 1958, when the Fourth Republic collapsed, France had twenty governments. 
Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet was the 17th Prime Minister in ten years, 
and came to power on January 1, 1956, six months before the nationalization 
of the Canal.115 In June 1957, shortly after the Suez debacle, Maurice Bourges-
Maunoury, the hawkish Minister of Defense, replaced Mollet. 116 Bourges-
Maunoury, a central figure in hatching the plans for the Suez War, lasted five 
months as prime minister.117 Mollet and Bourges-Maunoury were both rather 
inexperienced in matters of foreign affairs and in navigating the ship of state in 
their respective roles as they propelled France to war. 
France had two more prime ministers before Charles de Gaulle took office. 
In 1958, the Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle 
insisted that France adopt a new constitution bearing similarity to the United 
States’ model of an independent and all-powerful president.118 
2. The Road to War  
Article Seven of the Fourth Republic’s Constitution placed the power to go 
to war in the National Assembly, contingent upon the recommendation of the 
executive branch (the cabinet).119 It was thus somewhat similar to the United 
States’ requirement that Congress declare war, but different in that the Fourth 
Republic’s constitution did implicitly recognize the role of the executive in the 
matter. Article 7 stated: “La guerre ne peut être déclarée sans un vote de 
l’Assemblée Nationale et l’avis préalable du Conseil de la République”120 (in 
English, “[W]ar can not be declared without a vote of the National Assembly 
and the notice of the Council of the Republic”).121 “Without the vote” implied 
 
114 See generally id.   
115 See id.  
116 See id. During Bourges-Maunoury’s short term, France signed the Treaty of Rome, 
paving the way to the European Community. See generally LEPRINCE, supra note 38, at 107 
(2004). 
117 See ELGEY, supra note 110. 
118 1958 CONST. 5 (Fr.) (outlining the power of the president).  
119 See supra note 111 (describing Article 7 and the distribution of power between the 
executive and the National Assembly). 
120 Constitution de la IVe République, DIGITHÈQUE MJP (1999), http://mjp.univ-
perp.fr/france/co1946-0.htm#2. By contrast, the Constitution of the Third French Republic 
placed the power to declare war in the Executive Branch subject to parliamentary approval. 
1874 CONST. 9 (Fr.) (“The President of the Republic cannot declare war except by the 
previous assent of the two chambers.”). 
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that the initiative would come from the executive who would bring the 
measure to parliamentary approval. 
When Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, some high 
officers of the French military command, as well as a few cabinet ministers, 
were already at work planning his overthrow.122 Nasser, who recently acquired 
vast quantities of arms from the Soviet Union, was turning his old arms over to 
the Algerian rebels.123 Nasser was also providing military training and other 
support to the Algerian rebellion and embraced the Algerian cause as a part of 
the grand vision of pan-Arab liberation.124 Nasser’s rhetoric was intoxicating to 
Arabs as well as to the group of non-aligned developing nations. It was quite 
alarming to Western ears, especially to the French and the British, who 
experienced Nasser’s words as a call to shatter the world order as the French 
and British had known it.125  
While consulting with officials of the British government about the various 
options of dealing with the crisis, the French were separately exploring 
collaboration with Israel.126 
A short diversion to explain the growing closeness with Israel is in order. 
On May 25, 1950, the United States, Britain, and France imposed an embargo 
on arms sales to the Middle East in an effort to prevent another conflagration 
of war in the area.127 Following the 1955 Egypt-Soviet arms pact, as Israel felt 
 
122 See ELGEY, supra note 110. The French were not alone. Britain and the United States 
were also planning either a coup or an assassination, finding Nasser irritable and 
untrustworthy. See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 111 (describing Operation OMEGA, developed 
in March 1956, which was “the cornerstone of Anglo-American co-operation against 
Nasser”). 
123 See id. at 122 (stating that Nasser “refused to halt arms supplies” to the Algerian 
rebels). 
124 See id. at 121 (discussing Nasser’s support for the Algerian rebels); TURNER, supra 
note 17, at 228 (describing Nasser as “the self-proclaimed champion of Arab nationalism”). 
125 See LUCAS, supra note 57, at 149 (“The whole Western position in the Middle East 
would be jeopardized if Nasser gets away with this action.”). 
126 FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 180-81 (1992) (“Paris began seriously to consider joining 
Israel in a military venture against Egypt.”). The French did not initially report their 
negotiations with the Israelis because Britain had close ties with the Arab world, and a 
defense treaty with Iraq and Jordan. Id. at 182 (suggesting that Israel also had concerns 
about British involvement because of the British Anglo-Jordanian defense treaty); Laurie 
Milner, The Suez Canal: History, BBC (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml  (“In an attempt to strengthen 
security in the Middle East against Soviet influence, Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan 
signed a treaty known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955.”). Israel had been left out of this Pact. 
At that time Britain had no interest in collaborating with the Israelis. M. BAR-ON, OF ALL 
THE KINGDOMS, ISRAEL’S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING THE FIRST DECADE 
AFTER THE END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE 1948-1958, 164 (2006).  
127 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 20-21 (“[The agreement] called for ‘formal assurances’ 
from Middle East nations receiving Western military equipment that it would not be used 
against other states in the area. On May 25 the U.S., U.K., and France issued the Tripartite 
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increasingly threatened and was frantically looking for weapons to defend 
itself in the event of a second round of war, France decided to abandon the 
embargo, and agreed to sell arms to Israel.128 
A part of the budding French friendship towards Israel was rooted in the 
sympathy that members of the French government felt for the Jewish people.129 
French politicians and military officers who had been active in the Resistance 
were very familiar with the horrors of the Holocaust and felt a special 
responsibility towards the Jewish state.130 Others identified with Israel’s 
socialist ideology.131 But no one should underestimate the mighty role of real 
politik. The French identified Israel as a useful instrument in implementing 
their plans for a new/old order in the Middle East.132 The more exasperated the 
French became with Nasser, and the more frustrated they were with current 
events in Algeria, the cozier their relations with Israel were becoming.133 
Secrecy and compartmentalization kept the rapidly developing friendship 
between the two nations in a cocoon.134 France’s military and diplomatic 
relations with Israel were largely held behind closed doors. Talks between 
Israel and France were confined to the Ministry of Defense, where Minister 
Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, a former leader of the resistance, as well as the 
leading generals under his command were particularly friendly towards 
Israel.135 Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet also supported the intensifying 
relationship, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau (who was kept 
 
Declaration to that effect.”). 
128 FULLICK, ROY & POWELL, GEOFFERY, SUEZ: THE DOUBLE WAR 6 (1979) (“Israel . . . 
needed arms, and France supplied them.”) France was motivated, among other things, by the 
need for money. All arms to Israel at that time were sold for cash and at market value. 
GOLANI supra note 27, at 26-27 (French sale of arms to Israel was “subject to . . . payment 
in cash, of course”).  
129 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 6 (“[France] had discovered that she had much in 
common with Israel. The people of both countries had similar memories of Hitler’s 
persecutions.”). 
130 Id. at 6 (discussing the connection and sympathy French felt to Israel regarding their 
suffering at the hands of Hitler). 
131 Id. at 6-7 (“Guy Mollet, the post-war premier of . . . France, was a socialist in 
sympathy with Israeli socialism.”). 
132 GOLANI, supra note 27, at 26 (“As France’s troubles in Algeria were becoming more 
aggravated by the day, Israel managed to persuade the French that it could be quite useful to 
them.”). 
133 Id. at 45 (“France’s already close relations with Israel grew even closer as the crisis 
progressed.”). 
134 Milner, supra note 126 (in months before the attack, “[t]he French government had 
been meeting secretly with Israel”). 
135 GOLANI, supra note 27 at 45 (“[Quite a few French leaders at the time (such as 
Mollet, Bourgès-Maunory and Abel Thomas, the director-General of the Ministry of 
Defense) had not long before been the Resistance leaders, and therefore were sympathetic 
now to the Jewish state.]”). 
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as a Minister of Foreign Affairs in the subsequent Bourges-Maunoury 
government) joined Mollet in approving a scenario under which Israel would 
trigger an international military crisis that would precipitate Nasser’s 
demise.136 Like Anthony Eden, his British counterpart, Mollet insisted that 
Pineau refrain from sharing the information with the Quai D’Orsay (France’s 
foreign ministry), and so it was.137 French foreign officers were perceived to be 
either pro-Arab, uncomfortable with the interaction between Israel and France, 
or unhappy about the unusual plans for a preventive war and its cover-up.138 It 
was therefore decided that it would be better to keep them uninformed of any 
developments. Once the matter had ripened into a solid plan, it went out of the 
hands of the military command and into the domain of the civil government; an 
inner cabinet (gouvernment interne) was established headed by Prime Minister 
Mollet) and four other ministers.139 
All through September and the first half of October 1956, the French were 
following two tracks simultaneously. They were discussing with the British 
government the prospects of military action against Egypt140 and they were 
separately exploring military collaboration against Egypt with Israel.141 It 
appears that initially the British were adamantly opposed to Israeli 
involvement.142 It also appears that the Israeli government itself (as distinct 
from its zealous military command) was not too warm to the French plan.143 In 
September 1956, a secret delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Golda 
Meir (one of the few women in this story) visited Paris to discuss military 
options.144 She returned with the report that “the discussions ended with no 
concrete results.”145 However, General Maurice Challe, who conceived the 
military plan, continued to work out the details of the military attack with 
Israel’s military command as well as with Shimon Peres, the Director General 
 
136 GOLANI supra note 27, at 110 (“Mollet and Pineau . . . agreed on the ‘Israeli pretext’ 
idea.”). 
137 SKARDON, C. PHILIP, A LESSON FOR OUR TIMES: HOW AMERICA KEPT THE PEACE IN 
THE HUNGARY-SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, at 89 (2010) (“The Suez intervention was . . . a foreign 
policy-operation conducted outside of the Quai d’Orsay.”). 
138 DAVID TAL, THE 1956 WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 53 (2013) 
("[T]he hostility of the Quai d'Orsay . . . dictated a highly covert series of meetings and 
conversations."). 
139 See M. BAR ZOHAR, SUEZ ULTRA-SECRET 146 (1964).  
140 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 177 (referencing the continuation of “Anglo-French 
military planning”). 
141 Id. at 181 (detailing discussions between France and Israel of a joint attack). 
142 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 82-83 (stating that at first, it seemed “impossible to 
reconcile differences” between Israeli and British approaches to Suez). 
143 GOLANI, supra note 27, at 77 stating that Ben-Gurion’s instructions to a delegation 
headed to France indicated “his apprehensions about an Israeli-initiated war.” 
144 Id. at 77-78 (detailing the SIDON delegation’s travels to Paris to discuss the 
possibility of a joint military operation). 
145 Id. at 79. Meir was thereafter excluded from the war plans. 
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of the Ministry of Defense. Finally, on October 14, the French arrived in 
London to offer Eden collaboration with France and the Israelis.146 They relied 
on encouragement they received from Israeli military officers and civilian 
appointees, not elected officials. The essence of the plan was that Israel would 
commit an act of aggression (tantamount to ‘real war’ as distinct from a limited 
armed conflict) thereby providing the UK and France with the necessary cover 
to intervene militarily without appearing to be aggressors and violators of 
international law.147 
In London, Prime Minister Eden, aware that time was running out on the 
feasibility of military attack, quelled his reservations and accepted a 
collaboration with Israel.148 He recalled his Minister of Foreign affairs, Selwyn 
Lloyd, from New York and sent him to Paris to finalize the war plans.149 
The meeting in Sèvres between the French, the British, and the Israelis 
ended with the signing of the deal known as the Sèvre Protocol, or the 
“collusion.”150 Everyone present understood that the agreement was to be kept 
in total secrecy.151 
In his memoires, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau 
recalled that in the middle of the Sèvre discussions he left to inform President 
Rene Coty of the developments. Coty, who disapproved of these plans, is 
reported to have responded: “If the Israelis are willing to play a part in this 
comedy it is not up to us to dissuade them.”152 
The next day, Prime Minister Anthony Eden dispatched a letter to Prime 
Minister Guy Mollet. The letter did not mention the protocol, but stated that 
“Her Majesty’s Government has been informed of the course of the 
conversation held at Sèvres . . . They confirm that in the situation there 
envisaged they will take the action described.”153 The letter was addressed only 
 
146 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 77 (1979) (detailing the planning meeting between 
France and Britain). 
147 Id. at 77-78 (“Challe outlined the French proposals. They were that Israel should be 
persuaded to attack Egypt across the Sinai and that Britain and France . . . should then invite 
both sides to withdraw . . . so that an Anglo-French force could land to protect the waterway 
. . . Then, on excuse of separating the combatants, the allies would take control of both 
Canal and installations.”). 
148 Id. at 78 (“At last Eden had been shown a way in which the war could be started. It 
was the excuse for which he had been long searching.”). 
149 Id. (stating that Eden telephoned Lloyd “[w]ithin minutes of the two Frenchmen’s 
departure”). 
150 Id. at 78 (“[On] 24 October, the secret protocol of Sèvres was ready for signature.”). 
151 KYLE, supra note 17, at 330 (stating that the protocol “pledged total secrecy”). For a 
long time it has been believed that the only copy left was that kept by Ben-Gurion because 
the British destroyed theirs and the French insisted that they had lost it. However, Anthony 
Eden’s biographer reproduced a copy in his book, stating that it was found in the French 
archives. See THORPE, supra note 80. See also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.  
152 PINEAU, supra note 15, at 141.  
153 Letter from Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, to Anthony Eden, British Prime 
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to Mollet, and did not mention Ben-Gurion, in keeping with Eden’s 
determination to avoid any mention of collaboration with Israel.154 Mollet then 
composed a letter to Ben-Gurion ratifying the agreement to go to war with 
Eden’s letter attached to it.155 
Following Israel’s invasion of Egypt, Mollet called his cabinet to an 
emergency meeting to approve the appeal/ultimatum to Israel and Egypt. The 
ministers, who were not members of the inner cabinet, were not privy to the 
plans and were not expecting a war against Egypt, but they agreed to give it a 
chance.156 After some deliberation, the measure received unanimous 
approval.157 Mollet and Pineau then flew to London to meet with Eden, who 
had by then secured his own cabinet’s endorsement of the ultimatum.158 The 
two prime ministers had concerns about the timing of the ultimatum because of 
Eisenhower’s opposition, but overcame their hesitation.159 British General 
Keightly was ordered to occupy the Canal Zone as soon as Egypt rejected the 
ultimatum.160 
Returning to Paris in the evening, Mollet headed to the National Assembly. 
He presented the French and British ultimatum issued to Israel and Egypt 
earlier that afternoon and asked for “a massive vote of support, one that will 
send the message of the resolve and peaceful intentions of the French 
people.”161 Indeed, he got just the support he was hoping for. Unlike the 
 
Minister (Oct. 25, 1956), reprinted in Troen, S. Ilan, The Protocol of Sevres: 
British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1965, 1:2 ISRAELI STUDIES 122 ,137 (1996), 
available at http://www.brandeis.edu/israelcenter/about/troen1/TheProtocolOfSevres.pdf. 
154 Id. (full text of the letter). 
155 Letter from Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister, to Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime 
Minister (Oct. 25, 1956), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL 
821-22 (Baruch Gilead, 2008) (“Mon cher Premier Ministre: Je vous confirme l’accord du 
gouvernement Français sur le résultat des conversations de Sévres et les termes du protocol 
final auquel ells ont donné lieu.”). See also GOLANI, supra note 27, at 374 (1997). Eden sent 
emissaries to get French and Israeli copies of the agreement destroyed, but “by then Ben-
Gurion’s copy was hidden deep in his breast pocket.” BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 243. 
156 Bar-Zohar, supra note 139, at 174. 
157 Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFFICE OF 
THE HISTORIAN n.2, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-
57v16/d422#fnref1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (“French Cabinet that morning had 
unanimously approved French military intervention in the Suez Canal Zone.”).  
158 Id. (“The Embassy . . . noted that Pineau had left for London at 9:30 a.m. . . and 
Mollet at 11:30 a.m.”). 
159 FULLICK, supra note 128, at 92 (“Eden had taken the precaution of delaying his cable 
to Eisenhower telling him about the ultimatum . . . [thus]avoiding the danger of the 
President bringing last minute pressure on him to withhold it.”). 
160 The French had already prepared bills designed to replace the Egyptian money in the 
occupied Zone. Other plans for the occupation were also completed.  
161 Council of the Republic, Parliamentary Debates, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], October 30, 1956, p. 2109-
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British public, the French were eager to see an energetic government ready to 
do what it took to quell the rebellion in Algeria.162 Many saw Nasser as 
directly responsible for the trouble in Algeria and therefor approved of action 
against Egypt.163 The French National Assembly voted in favor by a margin of 
368 and 182 against.164 In France’s upper chamber, the Sénat, Mollet’s 
Minister of Justice François Mitterrand (to be France’s President decades later) 
presented the motion. Mitterand was not privy to the war plans, but went along 
with the plan.165 The Senate vote was even more enthusiastic: 289 were in 
favor and only 19 opposed.166 It is clear that the constitutional check on a 
trigger-happy executive was missing. The French Prime Minister did not feel 
that Article Seven of the French Constitution, which requires a declaration of 
war prior to issuing the ultimatum, should be literally followed. Rather, he 
probably believed that a formal endorsement after the ultimatum was issued 
and French Forces already engaged would suffice. The Prime Minister was 
likely confident that the Assembly would give him retroactive support. 
Needless to say, the Sèvres Protocol was not mentioned. In the protocol France 
had specifically agreed to provide the Israel air support until the Egyptian air 
force was destroyed.167 This provision, written in an appendix to the Protocol, 
was kept secret from the British, and withheld from the French Parliament as 
well.168 It is however doubtful that knowledge of the Appendix would have 
affected the majority of French Parliamentarians. For them, the legal niceties 
could not be held as barriers to what they considered a necessary and 
imperative action. 
 
38. See also BARALE, JEAN, LA CONSTITUTION DE LA IVE RÉPUBLIQUE À L'ÉPREUVE DE LA 
GUERRE 184-85 (1964). According to Barale, members of the assembly regretted the quick 
approval they gave the prime minister, once they realized the dimensions of the debacle. Id. 
at 186.  
162 KHOURI, FRED JOHN, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 211 (3d ed. 1985) (asserting that 
since the French blamed Egypt for the uprising in Algeria, "public opinion gave very strong 
support for the use of armed power in order to save French pride."). 
163 Id. (“France blamed Egypt's material and moral support for the persistence of the 
Algerian rebellion.”). 
164 ELGEY, supra note 110.  
165 SALLY BAUMANN-REYNOLDS, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND: THE MAKING OF A SOCIALIST 
PRINCE IN REPUBLICAN FRANCE 53 (1995). 
166  National Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], October 30, 1956, p. 4421-26.  
167 KYLE, supra note 17, at 566 (“The French Government undertakes to . . . ensure the 
air defense of Israeli territory.”). 
168 Id. at 566 (suggesting that France and Israel, “did not mention [the appendix] to the 
British representatives”). DAVID CARLTON, Great Britain, France and the Suez Crisis, in LA 
FRANCE ET L’OPERATION DE SUEZ DE 1956, at 63-64 (Ministre de la Defense, centre 
d’etudes d’historie de la defense). 
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3. Aftermath:  Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers  
 
In 1958, Charles de Gaul came to power.169 He insisted that a new form of 
government be established for France.170 The new French Constitution 
inaugurated the Fifth French Republic in place today. At first, Article 35 of the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic deviated only slightly from the arrangement 
obtained during the Fourth Republic. It required that a declaration of war be 
made by parliament, thereby implying that the government should bring forth a 
proposal upon which parliament would deliberate, before the vote.171 In the 
twenty-first century, following the two Iraq wars, France, like Britain, 
reconsidered its constitutional arrangement regarding war powers.172 It was felt 
that in the twenty-first century a declaration of war was too archaic to control 
the practice of sending troops abroad for purposes of “exterior operations,” or 
military ventures that would not involve the homeland.173 Still, French 
legislators thought that the financial burden of a war as well as the need for the 
legitimacy of the use of force necessitated parliamentary debate and 
approval.174 Two Commissions, one in the National Assembly and one in the 
Senate studied the matter.175 The prevailing sentiment was that the traditional 
discretion granted the executive in war matters should be maintained, but that 
legislative deliberations based upon timely information was imperative. In 
2008 Article 35 was amended as follows:176 
A declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament. The Government 
shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene 
abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It 
shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may 
give rise to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote. 
Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government 
shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the 
National Assembly to make the final decision. 
 
169 1958: De Gaulle Returns to Tackle Algeria, BBC, 
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/1/newsid_2995000/2995283.stm (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2015) (detailing de Gaul’s political career, including his return to power in 1958). 
170 Id. 
171 1958 CONST. 35 (Fr.) (“La declaration de guerre est autorisee par le Parlement”). 
According to Debbasch the text of the government’s proposal must refer to Article 35. See 
DEBBASCH ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 919 (3rd ed., 
1990); see also DUVERGER, M, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES (10th ed.,1987).  
172  See Assemblee Nationale No. 890, at 15-22 (2008). 
173 Id. at 16. 
174 Id. at 16. 
175 See Assemblee Nationale No. 890 (2008); Senate No. 388 (2008). 
176 July, 9, 2008, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]; Senate Report, 
June 19, 2008, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.].  
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If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall 
express its decision at the opening of the following session.177 
Thus, the new French arrangement is somewhat similar to the 
recommendations put forward in Britain and closer to the arrangement 
provided by the U.S. War Powers Resolution.178 It requires that notification to 
parliament be submitted rather quickly—within three days. However, it gives 
the Executive enough rope to pursue military action because it does not require 
a parliamentary vote that might embarrass the executive or cause a 
governmental crisis. That rope, however, lasts for four months. After that, a 
parliamentary authorization is required.179  
D. Israel 
1. Constitutional Framework  
With the end of the British Mandate over Palestine in 1948, a ferocious war 
erupted.180 The Jewish population in Palestine declared an independent Jewish 
state and named it Israel.181 The United Nations endorsed the idea of a Jewish 
state but neither the Palestinians nor Israel’s Arab neighbors accepted the new 
state as a legitimate fait accomplit.182 Israel’s Arab neighbors invaded the state, 
openly calling for its annihilation.183 From the Israeli perspective, this was a 
classic war of self-defense.184 Since 1948, Israel has fought many wars: wars 
of self-defense, preventive wars, and preemptive wars.185 The second war in 
 
177 Assemblee Nationale, REPUBLIC OF FR., www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
178 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C § 1541-1548 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this 
chapter to . . . insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”). 
179 Note that like the British proposal, the French constitutional amendment addresses the 
issue of executive action when parliament is not in session. The entire structure is more 
flexible than the U.S. War Powers Resolution and tries to strike a delicate balance between 
the needs of war and the needs to impose democratic oversight.  
180 ANITA SHAPIRA, ISRAEL: A HISTORY 155-76 (2012). 
181 Shimon Shetreet, The Grey Area of War Powers: The Case of Israel, 45 JERUSALEM 
Q. 27, 27 (1988) (citing Israel’s establishment as a self-proclaimed independent state in 
1948). 
182 BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 23 (explaining that in 1949 a major Arabic radio station 
announced: “We shall never stop planning . . . for the second round in which the Jews will 
be driven from our land”) 
183 KYLE, supra note 17, at 29-30 (detailing the response of Arab states when Israel 
declared itself an independent nation). 
184 GOLANI, supra note 27, at vi (describing Israel’s view of war with her Arab neighbors 
as, “defensive . . . undertaken reluctantly in response to an Arab attack”). 
185 Shetreet, supra note 181 at 27 (observing that since 1948, Israel “has been involved in 
six wars”). 
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this never-ending chain of wars took place in 1956, and is known as the Sinai, 
or the Kadesh, Campaign.186 
Israel’s Declaration of Independence explicitly expected a constitution to be 
adopted after the first popular elections.187 Following the elections in 1949, 
however, the assembly changed its name to the “Knesset,” and the constitution 
writing project was shelved.188 A Knesset resolution stated that a series of 
Basic Laws would be passed, which together would form a constitution.189 No 
timetable for the project was set. By 1956 no Basic Law had yet been passed, 
but two Basic Laws, one regulating the Knesset and one regulating the 
executive branch, were being drafted and discussed.190 None of these statutes 
addressed the matter of war powers.191 Should war be declared? By whom? In 
what process? It is interesting to reflect on the question why such a central 
issue, particularly vital in the case of Israel, was met with silence.192  
2. The Road to War  
It may well be that the Prime Minister was taking his cue from England, 
rather than from the United States or France.193 The Israeli equivalent of the 
 
186 The title “Kadesh” harked back to the biblical epic of the Israelites’ exodus from 
Egypt. According to the Bible, the Israelites camped in Kadesh before embarking on their 
journey to the land of Israel. 13 Numbers 26 (“They came back to Moses and Aaron and the 
whole Israelite community at Kadesh.”). Between 1948 and 1956 Israel engaged in 
numerous military “raids”, some of them bearing certain features of war. Shetreet, supra 
note 181, at 27 (suggesting that even when Israel was not at war, the interim periods were 
marked by continued conflict.) The Sinai Campaign, while designated as a campaign to 
distinguish it from an act of war, bore many features of war.  
187 THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (May 14, 1948), 
available at http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/Pages/default.aspx ([T]he Constitution . . . shall be 
adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948.”). 
188 A. RUBINSTEIN & B. MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 80 
(6th ed., 2005). 
189 AVNER YANIV, A Question of Survival: The Military and Politics Under Siege, in 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 96 (Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (asserting that 
the governing body agreed to work out a constitution in a piecemeal fashion, comprised of 
multiple ‘basic laws’).     
190 RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 188 at 713, 821.  
191 Shetreet, supra note 181, at 28 (lamenting that even after a Basic Law titled The Army 
was passed, “there remained many undefined areas, including the powers of the 
government, its relationship to the defense minister and the ways to put into effect civilian 
authority over the army.”); YANIV, supra note 189, at 96 (“The key question of who decides 
what, when, and how remains in abeyance.”). 
192 Matters of security and statutes related to military conscription and other aspects of 
national security were vigorously debated and legislated throughout the period. It is 
interesting that the one canonical tome on Israeli constitutional law, Rubinstein and Medina, 
does not include a discussion of the procedures to declare or make war.  
193 In general, Israelis like to think of their constitutional model as based upon the 
Westminster model. A closer look shows a pastiche of various influences, from the Ottoman 
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English royal prerogative was presumably, and impliedly, vested in the Israeli 
cabinet.194 It is safe to expect that not much thought was given to the subject, 
as Israel was expecting to fight only wars of self-defense, making a military 
response imperative and in keeping with the U.N. Charter.195 Such wars 
needed swift and decisive execution, and could therefore be rationally placed 
in the hands of the Executive. The decision concerning a preventive or 
preemptive war of choice was not contemplated and thus, one may theorize, 
did not require a legal arrangement. The Israeli pattern, therefore, appears to 
have been unfolding haphazardly and ad hoc.   
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was familiar with and committed to 
constitutional governance. Ben-Gurion was eager to model Israel after the 
Western Democratic example, including its component of the rule of law.196 
He understood well that he could not be the sole decision maker when it came 
to acts of war.197 This is why he brought the decision regarding Suez to the 
Cabinet on October 28, 1956.198 The debate in the Cabinet was lively and 
ended in an approval of the motion to launch “an action of several raids.”199 
 
to the French and the German. The term Basic Law is borrowed from the procedure adopted 
in West Germany after WWII. DANA ZARTNER, COURTS, CODES, AND CUSTOM 93 (2014) 
(referencing Germany’s post-WWII reorganization via their “basic laws”).  
194 Because the original Basic Law: The Government did not address the issue of war 
powers, it appears that section 32 of the Basic Law applied. This section stated: “The 
Government is authorized to perform in the name of the State and subject to any law, all 
actions which are not legally incumbent on another authority.” BASIC LAW: THE 
GOVERNMENT, 5761-2001, 23 LSI 32 (Isr.), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-
Archive/2001/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20The%20Government%20-2001-.aspx. See Shetreet, 
Shimon, Democracy Under Conditions of War in Israel, in PEOPLE AND STATE – ISRAELI 
SOCIETY 158- 160 (S. Stampler ed., 1989). 
195 Indeed Israel publicly considered the Suez War to have been one of self-defense, even 
though a substantial percentage of the population understood it as a war of choice, or 
“milhama yezuma.” For an excellent discussion of this see Golani, Motti, Did Ben Gurion 
Support or Oppose Dayan? Israel on the Road to a Preemptive War, 81 CATHEDRA 123 
(1996) [hereinafter Golani Dayan]. 
196 NIR KEDAR, MAMLAKHTIYUT, DAVID BEN-GURION’S CIVIC THOUGHT 152-65 (2009)  
197 See generally id. (explaining Ben Gurion’s political thought). The precedent to 
introducing the Israeli armed forces into hostilities was set in 1955, when Ben Gurion 
presented the cabinet with a motion to invade the Gaza strip. ZACH LEVEY, ISRAEL AND THE 
WESTERN POWERS 20 (1997) (documenting that on March 29, 1955 Ben Gurion suggested 
Israel invade Gaza). The motion failed. Id. at 20 (stating that Prime Minister Sharett 
mustered a majority cabinet vote to defeat the proposal to invade Gaza). Thereafter, motions 
to open hostilities (or a preventive war) were brought to the cabinet for approval. Golani, 
Dayan, supra note 195, at 128. 
198 Lahav, supra note 12 (“On Sunday 28 October 1956, Israel’s cabinet held its regular 
weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion placed on the table a motion ‘to perform an action of several 
raids.’”). 
199 Id. at 69. Note that despite the British and French insistence that Israel perform “war 
like acts” the prime minister avoided the term war and stuck to the description of “several 
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Two ministers, both members of the left-wing Mapam Party, dissented, 
warning the cabinet that it was approving a preventive war the end of which 
could not be foreseen.200 However, like Lord Walter Monkton, the British 
Secretary of Defense, they did not resign in protest.201 They stayed and 
assumed collective responsibility. Thereby, a pattern and a precedent had been 
set: the Prime Minister should bring a motion to launch  a war before the entire 
cabinet and seek their approval by majority vote.202 
The cabinet’s decision was like a cover hiding the contents of a boiling pot. 
The unarticulated constitutional standard was not actually followed. By the 
time Ben-Gurion convened his cabinet, the Chief of Staff had already declared 
an emergency mobilization of the reserves.203 The engine of the war machine 
was ignited and running. Even more importantly, the State of Israel, in utmost 
secrecy and through its prime minister, had already committed in writing to 
perform an act of aggressive war. The question whether the Israeli cabinet 
could, at that moment, vote against the motion was merely rhetorical. In 
theory, maybe yes. But in practice, the tiny and vulnerable Israel could not turn 
the tables on France and Britain, the big frogs in the pond, nor would the 
cabinet vote against Israel’s revered and powerful prime minister. 
Upon arriving in Tel Aviv from Sèvres with the Sèvres Protocol in his breast 
pocket and the cabinet meeting two days away, Ben-Gurion engaged in a 
marathon of meetings with cabinet ministers representing the different 
coalition parties, persuading each, one-by-one, to support the motion.204 On 
Sunday, October 28, he arrived at the meeting confident that a majority of the 
ministers would vote for the motion.205 
 
raids.” Id. at 64 (“He used the term raid or raids to designate the military action on the table, 
repeating it ten times during his presentation.”) He was thereby signaling alignment with 
Britain and France who called their own planned acts of aggression  “operation” or 
“l’expedition”.  
200 Id. at 63 (“Mapam, whose members opposed the motion, was represented by 
ministers Mordechai Bentov . . . and Israel Barzilai.”). 
201 Id. at 66 (“Following approval, the two dissenters stated that they would remain in the 
cabinet rather than resign.”). 
202 See id. In his book The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back, 1955-1957, 
Mordechai Bar-On reports a strong disagreement with Ben-Gurion by several cabinet 
members before the cabinet meeting after the prime minister return from France. BAR-ON, 
supra note 37. See also MICHAEL BRECHER, DECISIONS IN ISRAEL’S FOREIGN POLICY 275-76 
(1975) (stating that Ben-Gurion also informed two members of the Knesset Committee of 
Foreign Affairs and Security as well as leaders of the opposition).  
203 BAR-ON, supra note 37, at 298.  
204 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 63 n.6 (“Ben-Gurion returned from Sèvres late on 
Wednesday 24 October. As minister of defense, he had four days to prepare his military for 
the attack and to persuade his cabinet for launching the war.”). The consultations continued 
throughout the Sabbath. Golani, supra note 27, at 398.   
205 Id. at 193 (“[T]he formal Cabinet decision was made only one day in advance [of the 
attack], on October 28, without significant opposition.”). 
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The Israeli cabinet, just like the British and French cabinets, was approving 
a deal already done, a plan already put into motion by the Prime Minister.206 
But the structure of the Israeli Cabinet was different. Ben-Gurion served as 
both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.207 Therefore, he did not need to 
persuade another central decision maker, an expert in matters of defense who 
enjoyed the confidence of Parliament, that this action was necessary and 
legitimate.208 Nor did Ben-Gurion have a strong Minister of Foreign Affairs to 
evaluate the scene from the perspective of international relations, not to 
mention international law.209 Until June 1956, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
was Moshe Sharett, a man known for preferring diplomatic rather than military 
solutions.210 In 1955, Sharett had led the cabinet to derail a plan by Ben-Gurion 
to launch major raids or small-scale wars.211 In anticipation of a war against 
Egypt, Ben-Gurion decided to dispose of this skilled and powerful 
troublemaker and dissenting voice.212 In June 1956, Ben-Gurion maneuvered 
Sharett out of the cabinet and appointed his close confidante, Golda Meir, in 
his stead.213 As we saw above, Golda Meir did not support the proposal that 
Israel play the role of aggressor and was unhappy about a war fought behind 
Eisenhower’s back, but her loyalty to Ben-Gurion trumped her reservations.214 
Following her expression of doubt concerning the French plans, Meir was 
excluded from the inner circle of men planning the war. She was not invited to 
 
206 Id. (“Ben-Gurion had no problems obtaining public acceptance for the decision.”). 
207 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 79  (“On 2 November [1955] Ben-Gurion was confirmed 
in office as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.”). 
208 Recall that Lord Walter Monkton, Eden’s Secretary of Defense, resigned from his 
position because of his doubts about the plan but stayed in the cabinet; French Minister of 
Defense Bourges-Maunoury was actually the mastermind of the plan. 
209 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Christian Pineau was an early supporter of the 
plan. See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 117 (describing how Pineau urged the Israelis that “the 
opportunity for a joint operation against Nasser should not be missed“). British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd was skeptical and tried to negotiate a compromise with the 
Egyptians, but he ultimately deferred to his Prime Minister. Id. at 118 (remarking that 
Lloyd’s arrival at Sèvres surprised the French, “since they knew the depth of his objections 
to collaboration with Israel”).  
210 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 118 (“On the day after the Chantilly conference opened 
[June 24, 1956], Moshe Sharett . . . was suddenly and brutally forced to resign.”). 
211 “Operation Omer” was designed to forcibly open the Straits of Tiran shut off by 
Nasser in violation of international law. See GOLANI, supra note 27, at 14 (describing 
Operation Omer). The Cabinet decided to postpone an Israeli-initiated war and ultimately 
cancel Operation Omer. Id. at 16-17 (discussing the Cabinet’s decision).    
212 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 66 (stating that the “disharmony . . . between Ben-Gurion 
and Sharett was no secret”). 
213 Id. at 118 (stating that Sharett “was suddenly and brutally forced to resign”). 
214 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 181 (“Pineau was pleased when Israeli Foreign 
Minister Golda Meir agreed to pursue joint action with the French even if the British should 
refuse to take part.”). 
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the Sèvres conference.215 The relative weakness of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the Israeli cabinet was somewhat similar to that obtaining in the 
United Kingdom. In both cases the Minister of Foreign Affairs, despite 
substantial reservations, adhered to the Prime Minister’s plan and supported 
him in the final cabinet meeting that approved the motion to go to war.216 On 
the other hand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, was 
an active player in bringing the military plans to fruition.217 He remained a 
Minister of Foreign Affairs after Guy Mollet had stepped down and the 
hawkish Bourjès-Maunoury was sworn in as Prime Minister.218 Just like in 
France, the Israeli actors who relentlessly pushed for and implemented the war 
plan were the high echelons of the military and appointed officials in the 
Ministry of Defense.219 Two Israelis were particularly decisive: Chief of Staff 
Moshe Dayan and Director General of the Ministry of Defense Shimon 
Peres.220 Even at Sèvres, Ben-Gurion kept entertaining doubts about the plan 
hatched by the French, who were pushing him to accept the idea that Israel be 
the chief law violator.221 Dayan and Peres, working in tandem, vigorously and 
assiduously pushed Ben-Gurion to make the fateful decision.222 This state of 
affairs breached one of the cardinal elements of basic constitutionalism: the 
separation of the civilian and military command.223 Dayan and Peres, the first a 
 
215 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 314-323 (discussing important figures at the Sèvres 
conference). 
216 Lahav, supra note 12, at 75 (“Meir, whose cabinet role should have required analysis 
of the international scene, and who was savvy about international affairs, defended the plan 
in generalities, ‘the world’ would condemn Israel, but ‘we shall overcome.’”). 
217 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 80-84 (describing Pineau’s participation in the 
discussions and planning at Sèvres). 
218 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 548 (discussing how Bourgès-Maunoury emerged as 
Prime Minister). 
219 Id. at 316 (stating that “[a]part from Ben-Gurion himself there were no [Israeli] 
politicians” at Sèvres, but there were several military advisors). 
220 Besides supplying Israel a substantial amount of arms and recognizing Israel as a 
major ally in the international arena, the French also assisted Israel in building its nuclear 
power plant in Dimona. See Uri Bialer, Top Hat, Tuxedo and Cannons: Israeli Foreign 
Policy from 1948 to 1956 as a Field of Study, 7 ISRAELI STUD. 1, 68-69 (2002) (remarking 
on Israel’s “success in forming a strategic tie with France that included assistance in 
developing nuclear weapons”). Rumors have been circulating for years that the nuclear plant 
was a quid pro quo for the Israeli acquiescence to take the role of aggressor and invade the 
Sinai. BAR-ON, supra note 85, at 514. At Sèvres, Prime Minister Guy Mollet made it clear 
to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that the nuclear deal was tied to Israel’s willingness to play 
the part of the aggressor in the Suez War. 
221 See FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 81 (“To him [Ben-Gurion] it was an 
abomination to see Israel condemned as an aggressor.”). 
222 Id. at 84 (describing how Peres and Dayan persuaded Ben-Gurion to agree to the 
plan). 
223 In 1976, following the Yom Kippur War, the Knesset finally addressed this lacuna.  
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military commander of great charisma and the second an ambitious civilian 
appointee with no accountability to Parliament, prevailed upon the Prime 
Minister to accept the offer.224 The brakes—checks and balances—expected 
from a war cabinet representing various perspectives and public interests stood 
out in their absence.225 When Ben-Gurion brought the motion to his cabinet on 
October 28, the matter had already been decided. Indeed, a spirited debate 
ensued, but the end result was not in doubt.226 The troops were ready and the 
orders delivered.227 Israel was on its way to war.  
3. Aftermath:  Modifying the Constitutional Framework of War Powers  
The pattern established by Ben-Gurion slowly crystallized into dogma. Wars 
were generally perceived as matters of self-defense, to be decided by the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Defense (until 1967 the same person) upon the 
advice of the higher military echelons.228 When the Knesset passed Basic Law: 
The Government (with the expectation that eventually the basic laws would be 
collected into a constitution), not much thought was given to the question 
 
Basic Law: The Military, 5736-1976, SH No. 1197, p. 418 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm (“The Army is subject to the 
authority of the government.”). For Dayan’s zealous commitment to go to war, see 
MORDECHAI BAR-ON, MOSHE DAYAN: A BIOGRAPHY 1915-1981 (2014)(Isr.). Bar-On 
concludes: “It is hard to exaggerate Dayan’s role in finalizing the decision to launch the war 
in the Sinai. The decision was ultimately in the hands of Ben-Gurion, but Dayan knew how 
to handle his actions and his proposals in a way that will allow Ben-Gurion to reach a 
positive conclusion.” Id. at 155. Michael Bar-Zohar, the biographer of Shimon Peres and a 
Suez War enthusiast, emphasizes Peres’s pivotal role in bringing the idea of a war to 
fruition. MICHAEL BAR-ZOHAR, SHIMON PERES: THE BIOGRAPHY 194-209 (2006) (Isr.). For a 
general overview of the separation of civilian and military command, see also YORAM PERI, 
GENERALS IN THE CABINET ROOM: HOW THE MILITARY SHAPES ISRAELI POLICY (2006), 
particularly chapter 1 (discussing the civil-military relations in Israel).  See also infra note 
229. 
224 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 84 (describing how Peres and Dayan 
persuaded Ben-Gurion to agree to the plan). 
225 Although still shrouded in secrecy, it may well be that the French offer could be 
categorized as an offer “one could not refuse.” Rumors are that the French willingness to 
help Israel establish a nuclear reactor in Dimona was attached to Israel’s willingness to start 
a war. Another important military consideration was France’s willingness to sell Israel more 
sophisticated arms, willingness tied to Israeli cooperation in a war against Egypt. See 
ELGEY, supra note 110, at 173 (describing how the nuclear deal between Israel and France 
was reached). 
226 See generally Lahav, supra note 12 (describing in detail the structure of the Cabinet’s 
deliberations and the concerns raised during the meeting). 
227 FULLICK & POWELL, supra note 128, at 84-85 (summarizing the terms of the Sèvres 
Protocol, which included that Israel would launch a “strong attack” on October 29, 1956 
near the Canal Zone). 
228 See Lahav, supra note 12, at 64 n.10 (“[T]he policy of Israel’s government was to 
conduct ‘raids’ or limited combat operations, justifying them as acts of ‘self-defense.’”). 
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under whose authority should the country decide to go to war and how that 
decision should be made. Following the Yom Kippur War and public outcry 
concerning the vague relationship between the top military command and the 
Minister of Defense (Moshe Dayan, mastermind of the Suez War), the Knesset 
enacted Basic Law: The Army, which formally subordinated the military 
forces to the civilian cabinet.229 In 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin and 
his Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon (a young officer during the Suez War), 
led Israel in an invasion of Lebanon that was first presented as an act of self-
defense but soon unraveled as a war of choice.230 A year later, as the public 
became increasingly critical of the government’s handling of the war, 
Professor Shimon Shetreet of the Hebrew University submitted a proposal to 
the Knesset to amend Basic Law: The Government and for the first time 
regulate the war powers.231 This initiative led to the present Section 40 to Basic 
Law: The Government, which provides: 
40. (a) The state may only begin a war pursuant to a Government 
decision. 
(b) Nothing in the provisions of this section will prevent the adoption of 
military actions necessary for the defence of the state and public security. 
(c) Notification of a Government decision to begin a war under the 
provision of subsection (a) will be submitted to the Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee as soon as possible; the Prime Minister 
also will give notice to the Knesset plenum as soon as possible; 
notification regarding military actions as stated in subsection (b) will be 
given to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee as soon as 
possible232 
 
229 Basic Law: The Military, 5736-1976, SH No. 1197, p. 418 (Isr.), available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic11_eng.htm (“The Army is subject to the 
authority of the Government. . . . The Minister in charge of the Army on behalf of the 
Government is the Minister of Defence.”). For discussion of the constitutional responsibility 
of the civilian and military echelons in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, see PNINA 
LAHAv, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST 
CENTURY 229-37 (1997) (discussing how the Agranat Commission was tasked with 
investigating the war and it “considered two distinct loci of responsibility: the government 
and the military command”). 
230 See Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Concept of National Security, in NATIONAL SECURITY 
& DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL, 11, 41 (Avner Yaniv ed., 1993) (examining the distinction 
between “wars of no choice” and “wars of choice” in the Lebanon War context). 
231 DK (1992) 2071 (Isr.) (documenting deliberations on amendments to Basic Law: The 
Government).  
232 Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001, SH No. 1780 p. 158 (Isr.), available at 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic14_eng.htm. This section mirrors the 
replaced Section 51 of Basic Law: The Government. It came into effect in 2003. Id. (“law 
entered into effect with the January 2003 Knesset elections”); Basic Law: The Government, 
5752-1992, SH No. 1396 p. 214 (Isr.) (repealed 2001), available at 
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Section 40(a) captures the constitutional situation as applied by Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion in the Suez Crisis. The Government, presumably its 
plenum rather than its “war cabinet,” is expected by law to make the decision 
to go to war.233 Section 40(b), however, provides the Executive with a safety 
valve that may facilitate the circumvention of the legal requirement to have the 
cabinet vote on a decision to go to war.234 By providing that “nothing in the 
provisions of this section will prevent the adoption of military actions 
necessary for the defense of the state and public security,” this subsection in 
fact allows the introduction of Israeli forces into hostilities without a full 
cabinet approval if it is decided that such action is necessary for the defense of 
the State.235 This subsection both proves the enormous significance of the word 
“nothing” (if war is a matter of life and death then everything may hinge on 
that “nothing”) and the firm conviction that various forms of war acts cannot 
be squeezed into any legal formula.236 Subsection (b) does not indicate who 
may make such fateful decisions. Is it the Prime Minister? The war cabinet? 
The Chief of Staff? Any military officer or perhaps even a rabbi? This 
arrangement captures another aspect of the Suez crisis history. Indeed, the 
cabinet voted on the motion to go to war on October 28, 1956. But the contract 
between Israel, France and the United Kingdom under which Israel formally 
committed itself to go to war was signed at Sèvres, France on October 24. 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, jostled by Moshe Dayan, his Chief of Staff and 
Shimon Peres, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, made that 
decision.237 From the perspective of constitutional authority, one elected 
official (albeit revered and central) took it upon himself to commit the country 
to war. It appears that this state of affairs, consciously or not, stands behind 
Section 40(b). Thus, the pattern developed during the Suez Crisis has remained 
as the model followed by Israel’s decision makers. 
 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic7_eng.htm.  
233 Section 6 of the Government Law, 2001 provides that within the government there 
shall be a “national security committee” (similar to the British inner cabinet?) whose 
members shall be the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, if one is appointed, the 
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of 
Internal Security and the Minister of the Treasury. Section 6 further provides that the 
number of committee members may be expanded, provided it does not reach more than half 
of the number of the members in the cabinet itself. One may expect the initial decision to go 
to war to be made by the inner cabinet, but clearly Section 40(a) requires a vote by the entire 
cabinet to make the decision to go to war legal. Note that the Government Law should be 
distinguished from Basic Law: The Government and is designed to include technical 
arrangements.  
234 Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.  
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Section 40(c) delineates the role of the people’s representatives—the 
legislature—in the context of the war powers.238 The executive branch is 
expected to notify the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and 
the Prime Minister is expected to also give notice to the Knesset plenum.239 
The timing contemplated by Section 40(c) structures the relationship between 
the executive and the legislature in matters of war powers: the notification is 
expected to take place “as soon as possible”—an ambiguous term that may 
indicate that when it comes to matters of war, the Knesset is secondary to the 
Executive and its schedule is controlled by the Executive.240 Action under 
Section 40(b)—confirming the legitimacy of a range of actions not authorized 
by the cabinet and yet valid—ignores the Knesset’s plenum altogether and 
provides only for a notification to the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Security 
Committee.241 The term “notification” in this context is also significant. It does 
not call for a reasoned explanation of why the action was necessary “for the 
defense of the state or the public security” but only (presumably) for a 
statement that such action had been taken.242 This arrangement should be 
compared with the U.S. expectation expressed in the War Powers Resolution 
as well as with the British and French efforts to enact the expectation of 
legislative deliberations in a timely manner (or, better, recognizing that time is 
of the essence) into the war powers paradigm.243 
The history of Section 40 reveals the attachment of Israeli policymakers to 
the extreme flexibility granted the Executive in matters of war powers and the 
reluctance of legislators to demand a more meaningful share of this power. In 
1992, following a lengthy campaign to change Israel’s electoral system in the 
context of which the war powers were considered, the chair of the Judiciary 
Committee conceded that the matter of war powers had to be dropped because 
otherwise support for the electoral reform would fail.244 The year 1992 was one 
 




242 Note that the Minister of Defense at the time (Moshe Arens) opposed the requirement 
of notification, insisting it was not necessary. Of course, the full set of parliamentary 
oversight options are implicitly assumed to remain in place, from a vote of non-confidence 
to a parliamentary questioning. However, it is quite likely that Cicero’s famous dictum 
“Inter arma enim silent leges” is particularly applicable in this context.  
243 For a discussion of the relationship between time and war, see MARY L. DUDZIAK, 
WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES (2012). For example, most 
Americans believe that the United States entered World War II upon the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, but Dudziak shows that the nation’s entry into that war demonstrates “the use of 
executive branch war-related powers outside of a declared war.” Id. at 40.  
244 1 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL: LAW & GOV’T IN ISRAEL 165 (1992) (discussing an interview 
with Uriel Lynn, Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the 12th Knesset) (Isr.). The electoral 
reform—direct popular elections of the Prime Minister (some variation on the U.S. 
presidential model) was a disappointment, and in 2003 Basic Law: The Government 
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of constitutional rejuvenation in the Israeli political climate. Not only were 
discussions of a new electoral system submitted to the Knesset, but for the first 
time, two Basic Laws entrenching some basic liberal rights were enacted.245 In 
this context and because of the contentious history of the 1982 Lebanon War, 
there were expectations that a more structured arrangement in the matter of the 
war powers could be enacted into law.246 The deliberations of the members of 
the Judiciary Committee prior to the passage of Section 40 reveal two 
contending camps. On the one hand were those who wished to specify in the 
law that any preventive, initiated, or aggressive war would require a decision 
by the plenum of the cabinet while other military acts be subjected to a variety 
of lesser institutional approvals.247 In addition, this camp wanted legal 
obligations placed on the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defense to appear 
personally before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee when 
subpoenaed to discuss the security situation.248 On the other hand were those 
who preferred the status quo, arguing that Israel’s dire situation and need for 
immediate, decisive action required vesting in the government a large measure 
of freedom of action.249 The Ministry of Justice, representing the government, 
made clear its lack of enthusiasm for any legislation on the matter. Ultimately, 
the language of Section 40 mirrored the status quo ante, but made it more 
 
restored the previous electoral system.  
245 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.), available at 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 
5752-1992, SH No. 1387 p. 60 (Isr.), available at 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic5_eng.htm. These Basic Laws eventually led the 
way to judicial review.  
246 See Horowitz, supra note 230, at 40-44 (discussing the Lebanon War and its effects 
on how the Arab-Israeli conflict was perceived).  
247 The original Section 39(a) in the bill for the Basic Law stated: “The state will not 
declare war and will not initiate war.” The proposal also subjected any executive decision to 
the approval of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. See, e.g., DK (1992) 2073 
(Isr.); DK (1991) (Isr.) (on file with author) (documenting the deliberations of the Judiciary 
Committee on March 5, 1991, 12th Knesset); see also Shetreet, supra note 181, at 42-47 
(calling for Israel to reform its war powers and reviewing proposals to that effect); ISRAELI 
LABOR PARTY, NEW DIRECTIONS: REFORM IN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
OVER MILITARY ACTIONS (Shimon Shetreet, ed.) (on file with author). This report contains 
substantive proposals for subjecting a preventive war to the decision of the cabinet plenum 
and various requirements for less stringent forms of approval for a variety of other military 
actions.  
248 See DK (1992) 37 (Isr.) (on file with author) (statement of M.K. M. Shachal during 
deliberations of the Judiciary Committee, Protocol 354, 12th Knesset on March 3, 1992). A 
representative of the Ministry of Defense opposed the idea of any mandatory reporting by 
the Minister of Defense. Id. at 34.  
249 See, e.g., DK (1991) (Isr.) (documenting the deliberations of the Judiciary Committee, 
protocol 238 on March 5, 1991, 12th Knesset). The examples of the Entebbe Operation, the 
attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, and the Six Day War were frequently raised by those 
supporting a free hand to the government. Id.  
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explicit as discussed above.250 A private bill to amend Section 40 and oblige 
the government to make its announcement related to the opening of hostilities 
“no later than forty eight hours” instead of “as soon as possible,” was 
shelved.251 
Efforts to engage the court in the interpretation of Section 40 were 
unsuccessful. In July 2006, after the beginning of the Second Lebanon War, a 
petition was brought before the High Court of Justice to require the 
government to invoke Section 40(a) and declare war.252 A panel consisting of 
Chief Justice D. Beinisch, Justice A. Procaccia, and Justice E. Arbel, all 
women, rejected the petition. Israel has indeed gone a long way since 1956 to 
include women on the high court and thereby include women in making 
decisions related to war. But the parameters of the debate remained the same. 
The Government argued that it was acting on the basis of Section 40(b) rather 
than Section 40(a).253 Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice held that 
“under the circumstances the government could decide that the military action 
referred not to starting a war but rather military action for self defense in 
reaction to aggression.”254 At the same time, the Court also held that Section 
40(a) was in fact followed because the plenary of the government made the 
decision and reported its decision and actions to the Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee.255 The opinion ended by stating that “[t]he way by which 
the government acted. . .fits its authority and the range of discretion vested in it 
 
250 The language of Section 40 was incorporated into a proposal for a constitution for 
Israel by Professor Ariel Bendor, published in 5 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL: LAW & GOV’T IN 
ISRAEL 23 (1999) (Isr.), thereby giving it additional scholarly support.  
251 Private bill submitted on May 6, 2002. Operation Defensive Shield in the context of 
the Second Palestinian Intifada started a few weeks earlier. Evidently the nineteen 
legislators who proposed the bill sought some interaction with the executive. P/15/3701. A 
long discussion in the judiciary committee concerning the meaning of Section 40 took place 
in 2003. The Judiciary Committee, appointing itself as a “committee to pass a constitution 
based on nation-wide consensus, assembled an array of high level legal counsel and scholars 
to discuss who is the more appropriate branch of the government to make the decision to 
open a war.  Some insisted that only the executive could make fast and efficient decisions 
and that “legal niceties” should not obstruct its ability to act. On the other hand, the scholars 
included in the committee leaned more towards parliamentary approval of decisions to go to 
war. It does not appear that the committee reached any conclusions and the matter appears 
to have been dropped. Protocol 112, December 15, 2003, 16th Knesset (on file with author).  
252 HCJ 6204 / 06 Beilin v. Prime Minister (2) IsrLR 99 [2006] (Isr.).  Professor Beilin, a 
political scientist, served in several labor governments from 1995 through 2001.  
253 Id. at 106 (“[T]he government saw no reason in the present situation why it should 
make use of its power under s. 40(a) of the Basic Law: the Government; according to its 
outlook, it is carrying out military operations in accordance with s. 40(b) of the Basic Law: 
the Government . . . .”). 
254 Id. at 108 (author’s translation). 
255 Id. at 108 (“Even though the government decided that the military activity in Lebanon 
falls within the scope of the provisions of s. 40(b) of the Basic Law, de facto it also carried 
out all of the procedures stipulated in the law that are relevant to a decision under s. 40(a).”).  
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and therefore there is no cause for our intervention.”256 It should not be 
surprising to see the Court avoid the constitutional questions and refuse to take 
a stand in such matters. Yet, it is encouraging to see the Government reflect 
awareness of its limits and make an effort to reason its actions in terms of the 
law. Israel does not appear to be ready to follow the United States, the United 
Kingdom, or France and provide for substantial legislative involvement in the 
matters of war powers, but it does appear that some measure of parliamentary 
involvement has been achieved.  
II. THE UNITED STATES  
A. Diplomacy:  The U.S. Reaction to the Eruption of War in the Middle East  
As stated above, once Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, the United States 
was intent on trying to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis.257 Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles largely engineered the diplomatic effort in 
cooperation with the United Nations.258 American intelligence closely 
monitored the movement of forces in the area around the canal and 
documented British, French, and Israeli military maneuvers of a character 
indicating preparations for an impending war.259 President Eisenhower and his 
administration strongly warned the parties numerous times to refrain from any 
aggressive action.260 From the American perspective, the fact that the three 
belligerents succeeded in keeping their impending attack plans secret must 
have been experienced as a serious intelligence failure and a devastating 
betrayal of friendship, at least on the part of the British government.261 To add 
 
256 Id. at 108-09 (“[T]he manner in which the government acted in making the decisions 
under discussion is consistent with its powers and the scope of discretion given to it, and it 
does not give rise to any ground for our intervention . . . .”). 
257 There is voluminous literature on U.S./Egypt relations since Nasser’s rise to power. 
See, e.g., Peter Hahn, National Security Concerns in U.S. Policy Toward Egypt, 1949-1956, 
in THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL REASSESSMENT 
91, 97 (David W. Lesch, ed., 1996) (“Eisenhower sought to use diplomacy to delay a British 
attack, on the calculation that time would cool British tempers and avert war.”); JEAN 
EDWARD SMITH, EISENHOWER IN WAR AND PEACE 694-95 (2012) (discussing Eisenhower’s 
insistence that “Egypt was within its rights” and that war should be avoided).  
258 See, e.g., FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 164 (1992) (discussing Dulles’s trip to London 
for an international conference in August 1956 to discuss international control of the Canal); 
SMITH, supra note 257, at 698 (describing Dulles’s presentation of the United States’ cease-
fire resolution to the U.N. General Assembly). 
259 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 184-86 (“Eisenhower administration officials were well 
aware that something serious was about to occur . . . .”). 
260 SMITH, supra note 257, at 695-97 (describing Eisenhower’s efforts to avert war). 
261 Id. at 697 (“[Eisenhower] felt he had been betrayed by [British Prime Minister] Eden 
and was furious.”). 
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injury to insult, the attack took place one week before the presidential 
election.262 
Following the Israeli invasion but before the issuance of the ultimatum by 
Britain and France, President Eisenhower suspended much of his political 
campaign and focused on international affairs. His demand that Israel 
withdraw amounted to an ultimatum.263 Two days later, when he realized the 
British and French involvement, he immediately suspected collusion among 
the two European powers and Israel and was torn between two reactions.264 
Britain had been the United States’ most trusted and closest ally during WWII. 
It was also a senior member of NATO and a staunch ally in the Cold War.265 
There is evidence that had the British implemented their plans of attack swiftly 
and come to control the Canal, the President might have turned a blind eye to 
the invasion.266 But Prime Minister Eden decided to stall military action.267 He 
thought that if the United Kingdom appeared as a responsible world power 
simply trying to restore order in the region (rather than as an active partner in 
the operation aimed at restoring the status quo ante), its prestige and legitimacy 
would be preserved.268 Recall that the Sèvres agreement stipulated that Israeli 
forces would approach the Canal, thereby appearing to threaten its safety.269 
That was the pretext Eden believed he needed in order to issue an ultimatum 
and make the United Kingdom appear to be interfering solely in order to 
restore peace.270 Eden was determined to show the world that the British and 
French intervention was motivated by a desire to uphold the rule of 
international law. This was his reason to delay the British assault in the Canal 
area.271 But from Eisenhower’s perspective the delay was fatal.272 As the hours 
 
262 Id.  The 43rd presidential elections took place on November 6, 1956.  
263 BRECHER, supra note 202, at 286-88.  
264 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 207 (“Ike was . . . arguing with himself whether to be tough 
or diplomatic with the allies who had double-crossed him.”). 
265 See id. at 203 (recalling that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 stated that America, 
Britain, and France “would support any victim of aggressions in the Middle East”). 
266 LUCAS, supra note 57, at 265 (“Even Eisenhower was prepared to accept a fait 
accompli if intervention was quick and successful.”). 
267 Id. (“Britain’s only possible salvation was delaying the passage of an Assembly 
resolution long enough to take control of the Suez Canal Zone, possibly provoking the 
Egyptians to overthrow Nasser.”). 
268 FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 184 (“The Sevres plan created an option [for the British] 
to remove Nasser with the possibility of retaining world opinion.”). 
269 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 188 (describing the plan set forth in the agreement at 
Sèvres). 
270 Id. (“The plan was that once the Israelis began to advance toward the Suez Canal 
Zone, Britain and France would issue an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to cease fighting and 
accept Anglo-French occupation of the Canal Zone. If Egypt, as expected, rejected the 
ultimatum, Britain and France would begin bombardment on October 31, followed by troop 
landings.”). 
271 Both France and Israel were extremely frustrated by Eden’s decision but had to defer 
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passed, delay in the Anglo-French assault tilted the pendulum. Already furious 
at being betrayed, he decided to take the moral high ground, emphasize the 
supremacy of the United Nations’ Charter, and coerce the Europeans to abort 
their mission.273 Only at that moment, then, did the United States decide to 
abandon the path of real politick and embark on the path of moralism.   
B. U.S. President’s Constitutional Powers in the Service of Diffusing the 
International Crisis and Avoiding a War 
What were the constitutional mechanisms through which the President 
accomplished his plan to subvert the Suez War? He actively used four powers 
and refrained from using a fifth.274  
1. The President’s Implied Power as “Sole Organ” of Foreign Affairs275 
In public, President Eisenhower, as well as his Secretary of State, John 
Foster Dulles, condemned Britain and France for a gross violation of the 
United Nations Charter.276 He ordered his ambassador to the United Nations, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council 
 
to him, as among the three, the United Kingdom was the superior military power. See 
GOLANI, supra note 27, at 185-87 (explaining that Israel needed France to supply it with 
arms, and that “France, for all its military readiness, felt itself dependent on Britain in every 
aspect of a possible strike against Egypt”).  
272 “Eisenhower, as a military man, was harshly critical of the Anglo-French military 
operations saying that ‘there was no excuse for the long delay in the landing of . . . troops . . 
. once they had made the decision to do so.’” NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 261 (quoting 
Eisenhower’s statement at a National Security Council meeting on November 8). 
273 See Smith, supra note 257, at 697. Both sides to the conflict emphasized their moral 
loyalty to the rule of law, evidently an indeterminate concept.  
274 Question not addressed: If Eisenhower lost and Adlai Stevenson were elected 
president on November 6, 1956, and if Stevenson indicated his preference to support the 
European Powers, would Eisenhower’s constitutional powers, which he could use until 
inauguration in January, be less potent? Note, too, in this context that following the 1956 
elections both houses of Congress were in the hands of the Democrats. See Nancy Amoury 
Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and International Law, 52 
Hastings L.J. 303, 305, 335 (2001) (“[L]ame ducks have typically commanded little ability 
to conduct foreign affairs even if they desired to. That is, once an administration has lost an 
election, foreign governments usually shift their focus to the incoming administration.” 
(Footnote omitted)); see generally Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 
B.U. L. REV. 947 (2003) (discussing administrative law issues regarding presidential power 
during transitions). 
275 See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (discussing the 
“plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in 
the field of international relations”). 
276 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7 at 192 (1992) (explaining the United States’ position as 
encapsulated in the “American-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire, the withdrawal 
of Israeli, French, and British forces, and the reopening of the canal”). 
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where a strongly worded resolution condemning the invasion was proposed.277 
Britain and France, foreseeing this move, used their power as Security Council 
members and vetoed the resolution.278 They expected their veto to put the 
matter to rest. 
Eisenhower was adamant not to let the matter go and had more tricks in his 
bag to accomplish his plan. Thus, the expectation that the veto mechanism 
would put the matter to rest was thwarted by another structural process enabled 
by the Charter. 
In 1950, during the crisis in Korea, the United States led the United Nations 
General Assembly in passing the Uniting for Peace resolution, enabling the 
General Assembly to consider security matters vetoed by one of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council.279 This resolution was passed by 
the Western powers against the invocation of a veto in the Security Council by 
the Soviet Union.280 Now it was invoked against two of NATO’s most senior 
members.281 In public, Eisenhower’s justification for this quite startling and 
unexpected move was the equal protection of the laws.282 All United Nations 
members are bound by its charter and none shall be allowed to violate its 
 
277 Id.   
278 U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters 
shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of 
the permanent members.”). It should be noted that this was the first time that the United 
Kingdom exercised its veto power. See S.C. Res. 119, U.N. Doc. S/1956/3721 (Oct. 31. 
1956) (“The Security Council, considering that a grave situation has been created by action 
undertaken against Egypt, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent 
members at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from 
exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in 
General Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950, in order to make appropriate 
recommendations.”). 
279 Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. 377 (V) A (Nov. 3, 1950) (“[I]f the Security 
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately.”).  
280 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 365. 
281 See id. (“Only on the morning of 29 October, just before news of the Israeli attack 
came through to New York, Henry Cabot Lodge had been speaking to his French and 
British colleagues of using the procedure for the first time against the behavior of the Soviet 
forces in Hungary. Now it was to be used, not against Russia but against Britain and 
France.”). 
282 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 226 (“In a rare rhetorical flourish, he expanded the core 
principle of the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘equal protection of the laws,’ to apply to 
international affairs: ‘As there can be no second-class citizens before the law in America,’ 
he asserted, ‘there can be no second-class nations before the law of the world 
community.’”). The fingerprints of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) are 
quite evident. 
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principles.283 The General Assembly convened immediately following the 
veto’s invocation, the Soviet Union joined the United States in condemning the 
aggressors (while its tanks were occupying Budapest), and a variety of 
sanctions were considered.284 The Assembly remained in session between 
November 1 and November 10 and, with vigorous American leadership and 
Soviet support tightened the noose around the two European powers until they 
accepted defeat and announced withdrawal.285  
2. The President’s Powers as Commander-in-Chief  
Eisenhower immediately declared that the British and French attack 
amounted to a violation of the tri-partite agreement of 1950.286 The President 
understood well that relying on the tri-partite agreement might lead to U.S. 
intervention to restore the status quote ante. Eisenhower ordered the Sixth 
Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean, to be on high alert.287 While he was 
contemplating further action, Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin issued a 
statement condemning the Suez invasion and threatening military intervention 
to defend Egypt’s sovereignty.288 These warnings, interpreted to mean a Soviet 
threat to use nuclear weapons against the European powers,289 placed 
Eisenhower in a terrible dilemma.290 The United States had an obligation under 
the tri-partite agreement, but now it was experiencing a conflicting obligation 
under the NATO treaty to defend Britain and France against Soviet 
 
283 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2 (“All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the 
rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
284 The United States and the Soviets found themselves to be unlikely allies in the 
Security Council. See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 192 (“In the Security Council the United 
States found itself awkwardly and uncomfortably in agreement with the Soviet Union . . . 
.”). 
285 See id. at 192-96 (suggesting that because of American and Soviet efforts in the 
Security Council, the British “cabinet agreed to open negotiations with the United Nations 
commander to transfer British-occupied areas to his control [and] [t]he British succumbed to 
American coercion”). 
286 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 203-04 (discussing Eisenhower’s concerns that French 
and British intervention would force America to intervene under the Tri-Partite Declaration 
of 1950 because “America could not afford to appear like ‘we are a nation without 
honor.’”). 
287 See id. at 246-47 (“The [Joint Chiefs of Staff] viewed the situation as the closest they 
had come to war with the Soviet Union since World War II, so the entire Navy was directed 
to ‘maintain readiness to implement emergency war plans.’”). 
288 See id. at 244 (describing Soviet statements that they intended “to crush the aggressor 
and reestablish peace in the [Middle] East by using force”). 
289 These warnings also threatened Israel’s very survival.  
290 See id. at 245 (explaining that Bulganin proposed that the United States and the 
Soviet Union work together in the Middle East by issuing “an ultimatum to the combatants, 
announce a readiness to intervene, and jointly mobilize their naval fleets”). 
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aggression.291 Matters soon got much more complicated. Rumors began to 
circulate that Soviet intervention on behalf of Egypt was imminent.292 In 
Washington, on November 6, Election Day, the Joint Chiefs convened, made 
plans “to improve readiness for a general war,” and informed the President that 
he should immediately return to the White House from his stay in 
Gettysburg.293 Once the President returned the meeting at the White House was 
“nothing less than a council of war.”294 Using his powers as Commander-in-
Chief, Eisenhower issued an order to put “the Sixth Fleet and the Atlantic and 
Pacific fleets on battle-ready alert, deploying additional ships, submarines, and 
tactical air resources, and placing heavy troop carrier wings on the twelve-hour 
alert.”295 Once the orders were in place, the President drove to the Sheraton 
Park Hotel, to watch the election returns.296 He won by a wide margin.297 It is a 
part of the nature of war that it is often earnestly justified, even in the minds of 
the decision-makers themselves, as a means to defend peace. As the United 
States was preparing for war, the President-elect told the American people that 
he would continue to work “for peace in the world.”298 
 
291 See id. at 247 (describing the United States’ response to Soviet aggression, where the 
joint chiefs moved American ships into a position “where they would be interspersed with 
the British and French navies—a move designed to say to the Soviet Union, in the words of 
a subsequent top secret study by the Navy, that ‘an attack on one would be an attack on 
all.’”). 
292 See id. at 247 (explaining the Soviet’s warning messages “demanding that Britain, 
France, and Israel implement a cease-fire within twelve hours and withdraw from Egypt 
within three days or be faced with the prospect of American and Soviet Union military 
assistance to Egypt”). 
293 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 252-53 (“[E]veryone agreed it was essential to ask the 
president, without fanfare, to come back as quickly as possible.”). Eisenhower and his wife 
drove to Gettysburg to vote in the elections. Id. at 250.  
294 Id. at 253. In attendance were eighteen men, the vice president and the top leadership 
of the Defense and State departments, including the Joint Chiefs. Id. 
295 Id. at 257 (citing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joint Chiefs to Certain 
Commanders (Nov. 6, 1956) in DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956, 
VOLUME XVI, at 1035-36 (Nina J. Noring & John P. Glennon eds., 1990). 
296 See id. at 253 (“About ten that evening, the Eisenhowers, friends, and family traveled 
to the Sheraton Park Hotel, where a suite had been reserved for watching the election 
returns.). 
297 See id. (“Even though it had become apparent earlier in the evening that the president 
had won reelection by a huge margin, Eisenhower did not go downstairs to address 
supporters until 1:45 a.m.”). 
298 Id. at 257 (citing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Radio and Television Remarks 
Following the Election Victory (Nov. 7, 1956) in DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1956, at 1089-91 (1999) (“I conclude with a pledge: with whatever 
talents the good God has given me, with whatever strength there is within me, I will 
continue—and so will my associates—to do just one thing: to work for 168 million 
Americans here at home—and for peace in the world.”). An experienced war general, he 
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3. Recognition Powers  
Eisenhower was simultaneously handling the Suez Crisis and the Soviet 
invasion and occupation of Hungary on November 4, 1956, which unfolded 
precisely as the Suez Crisis was escalating.299 It was not easy to commit the 
United States’ forces to the rule of international law against its own allies 
while simultaneously ignoring the flagrant violation of the same principles by 
its Moscow archrival.300 In other words, it was awkward to apply moralism 
when it came to Suez and realpolitik when it came to Hungary. Eisenhower 
considered breaking off diplomatic relations with Moscow.301 He had full 
power to do so under Article II’s recognition powers and such a move would 
have demonstrated a more even treatment of both crises and all perpetrators.302 
But the President decided it would be a futile gesture. The United States had 
long accepted Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Thus the policy based on 
moralism was applied against America’s historic friends while the policy of 
realpolitik was applied against it declared enemies.303 
 
must have known that while his battle ready order could act as a mere deterrent, preventing 
the Soviets from starting a war, the order could still ignite violence between the 
superpowers.  
299 See id. at 238 (describing the “perfect storm” brewing on November 4, 1956 as the 
Suez crisis “mixed with the growing crisis in Eastern Europe). 
300 See id. at 239 (illustrating the gravity of Soviet actions on November 4, 1956 when 
“the Soviets delivered a four-hour ultimatum to the Hungarians stating that if their 
government did not capitulate, Soviet forces would bomb Budapest. Later that day, the 
Russians sent 200,000 troops and four thousand tanks into Hungary”). 
301 See id. at 261 (highlighting that although Eisenhower called Soviet actions in 
Hungary “a bitter pill for us to swallow,” he ultimately concluded that “breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Moscow would accomplish nothing.”). 
302 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 011, at 1 (2015) 
(“The Constitution vests in the President the power to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. By derivation from these Constitutional provisions, the President exercises primary 
authority and responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign policy.”). President 
Eisenhower did not believe breaking off relations with Moscow was a viable solution. See 
NICHOLS, supra note xx, at 261 (“By this time, thousands of Hungarians had died and more 
than 200,000 refugees were pouring across Hungary’s borders into neighboring states. Ike 
had concluded that breaking off diplomatic relations with Moscow would accomplish 
nothing.”). 
303 But note persistent indications that had Britain swiftly and resolutely occupied the 
Canal Zone, Eisenhower may have accepted the move and avoided the steps described 
herein. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 233 (describing the United States’ position that Britain 
should either “comply with the goddamn cease-fire or go ahead with the goddamn invasion. 
Either way, we’ll back ‘em up if they do it fast. What we can’t stand is their goddamn 
hesitation waltz while Hungary is burning”). 
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4. Powers as Head of the Vast Federal Bureaucracy  
The reference to “politics” as distinct from “war” in Von Clausewitz’s 
famous maxim is fully illustrated in the economic pressures placed on Britain 
during the crisis.304 Historians agree that political and economic pressures 
indeed led to the collapse of the Anglo-French operation in Suez.305 These 
pressures were expressed in two ways: monetary pressure and the manipulation 
of oil supply.306 In the financial markets, the pound sterling had been 
weakening since the nationalization of the Canal in July 1956. However, 
immediately following the invasion there occurred a “run on the pound.”307 In 
the first two days of the British invasion of Egypt, Britain lost $50 million in 
currency reserves, and “speculation accelerated against the pound in currency 
markets.”308 Therefore, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (minister of 
the treasury) asked the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to return British 
funds previously paid into the fund.309 The U.S. Treasury Department declined 
the request.310 There was little doubt that that action by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury was orchestrated by the White House and was not based on strict 
rules.311 Rather, the Treasury Department’s decision was based upon executive 
 
304 See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 12 (J. J. GRAHAM trans., 3d German ed. 1873) 
(“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Lessons from 
the Balkans for American Foreign Policy: Building Civil Society Within a Multilateral 
Framework, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 229, 235 n.6 (2002) (noting that other translations commonly 
render Von Clausewitz’s maxim as “war is the continuation of politics by other means”). 
305 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 195 (“The British were now faced with the U.S. 
Federal Reserve Board selling British currency, Washington’s refusal to advance a 
temporary loan, and American obstruction to withdraw money from the IMF.”). 
306 See id. at 197 (“For the duration of the crisis, two issues dominated British policy: the 
mechanics of British withdrawal, and the clearing of the canal to permit the resumption of 
oil shipments.”). 
307 See id. at 194 (“The next day a run on the pound developed, and the British situation 
grew increasingly critical.”). 
308 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251; see also FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 190-92 (“By 
November 2 the United Kingdom had lost $50 million in gold reserves, and confidence in 
sterling was declining.”). 
309 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251 (“Harold Macmillan, the chancellor of the exchequer . . 
. had anxiously asked the International Monetary Fund to return the British quota—the 
funds his government had previously paid into the fund.”); FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 196 
(describing the United States’ warnings “that if the United Kingdom pulled its gold and 
dollars out of the IMF, the British could be heading toward bankruptcy”). 
310 See id. at 194 (describing that the U.S. Treasury Department declined to extend 
assistance to Britain until “a cease-fire were arranged”). 
311 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251 (“While the British cabinet was in session the 
morning of November 6, Macmillan learned that the American Treasury Department—no 
doubt following Eisenhower’s orders—had vetoed the return of the IMF funds until Great 
Britain agreed to a cease-fire.”). 
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discretion.312 Following Britain’s decision to fully withdraw, the IMF 
reciprocated by abiding by the British request to withdraw funds from the 
IMF.313 Throughout November, Harold Macmillan, the British Secretary of the 
Treasury, urged George Humphrey, his American counterpart, to release IMF 
funds to Britain to no avail.314 Once the British decision to abide by all the 
United States conditions was announced, the Treasury Department reversed its 
position.315 Something must have happened during the meeting between the 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the British delegation: 
At the beginning of their meeting on December 3, Humphrey continued 
to insist that his government could not support a large-scale support 
operation from the IMF. Then, quite abruptly and to the astonishment of 
his visitors, he swept aside those worries and proposed that the British 
should draw $561 million immediately and take out a stand-by 
arrangement for another $739 million, a massive total package of $1.3 
billion (100 percent of the U.K. quota in the IMF).316 
 
312 See id. See also KYLE, supra note 17, at 500-03 (discussing tensions between the 
United Kingdom and the United States during the UK’s attempts to obtain financing from 
the IMF); HAROLD MACMILLAN, RIDING THE STORM 1956-1959, at 163-68 (1971) (reporting 
the U.S. Government’s opposition to allowing Great Britain to draw on IMF funds “as a 
breach of spirit, and even of the letter of the system under which the Fund is supposed to 
operate”); TURNER, supra note 17, AT 255-58 (discussing the tension between the American 
government, including President Eisenhower, and the British government over the 
withdrawal of IMF funds). Nichols reports that “the denial of that request nurtured 
suspicions among British leaders that the rampant speculation on the pound ‘was being 
stimulated by the United States Treasury.’” NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 251. For an analysis 
of the monetary crisis, see Adam Klug & Gregor W. Smith, Suez and Sterling, 1956 
(Queen’s Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1256), available at 
http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6494165.pdf.  
313 See FREIBERGER, supra note 7, at 203 (explaining that once Britain complied with the 
United States’ requests, “[t]he financial aid which the British required was granted as well 
as a new loan with satisfactory terms for repayment”). 
314 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 194 (“On the morning of the 6th [of November] 
Macmillan telephoned U.S. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey seeking 
assistance.”). 
315 See James M. Boughton, Was Suez in 1956 the First Financial Crisis of the Twenty-
First Century?, 38 FIN. & DEV. (2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/boughton.htm (discussing the causal link 
between Britain’s agreement to withdraw and the IMF’s approval of funding. The IMP 
approved Britain’s funding request “and Britain immediately made the drawing of $561 
million to replenish its reserves and announced that it had another $739 million available on 
stand-by”). 
316 Id.  
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Humphrey also announced that his department would recommend that 
Congress immediately waive $143 million in interest payments on a World 
War II loan due December 31.317 
The other matter of critical importance was oil. The Suez crisis shut off two 
of the three major oil supply routes to Europe: the Canal itself, blocked by 
eight or nine ships sunk there by Egypt, and the Iraq pipeline.318 As a result, 
Europe was facing a serious oil shortage and winter had already entered the 
gate.319 The threat to the European economies was evident. The United States 
could and eventually did help, but it exacted the same price it was demanding 
in relation to the monetary crisis: unconditional British withdrawal.320 United 
States help took the form of encouraging U.S. oil companies to increase oil 
production.321 But Eisenhower feared that an open decision to increase oil 
production might exacerbate Arab rage at the invasion and might result in an 
Arab oil embargo.322 Deceptive tactics and secrecy came to the rescue. The 
White House “approved the movement of U.S. Gulf Coast oil to the East Coast 
in foreign-flag tankers, a move designed to camouflage preparations for 
sending it to Europe.”323 In addition, on November 30 the U.S. Office of 
 
317 See Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in Augusta, 
Georgia, and the Secretary of State in Washington (Dec. 3, 1956), in DEP’T OF STATE, 
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ 
CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956, VOLUME XVI, at 1240 (Nina J. Noring & John P. 
Glennon, eds., 1990) (stating that “George Humphrey was prepared to give clearance to” 
Macmillan’s statement to “the House of Commons that the U.S. Treasury would recommend 
to the U.S. Congress that it waive $143 million interest payment on a World War II loan, 
due on December 31”). 
318 See Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council 
(Nov. 8, 1956), available at http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/nss/documents/eisenhower-
suez-hungarian-crises.html [hereinafter NSC Memorandum] (explaining that the “Suez 
Canal was now thoroughly blocked by at least eight or nine ships which had been sunk in it. 
The Iraq pipeline had been sabotaged and three of its pumping stations destroyed. The 
Aramco tapline was still intact, but it was touch-and-go as to how long it would remain”); 
see also TURNER, supra note 17, at 249 n.49 (citing reports from The Times of London and 
The Economist that discussed the oil routes from the Middle East and the effects that the 
closure of the Suez Canal had on these routes). 
319 See TURNER, supra note 17, at 249 n.49 (noting that as of November 1956, Europe 
faced a loss of 94 million tons of oil that would normally come from the Suez Canal and the 
Northern Pipeline). 
320 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 262-63 (discussing Eisenhower’s requirement of “the 
equivalent of unconditional surrender from the British and French” before providing their 
“needed supplies of oil”). 
321 See id.  at 261 (discussing the United States’ support of Britain through American oil 
production). 
322 See id. (“Eisenhower asked . . . if American oil production could be increased without 
appearing to the Arab nations to be ‘bailing out the British and the French.’”). 
323 See id. at 261 (citing NSC Memorandum, supra note 318, which explained that the 
President approved “[a]uthoriz[ing] the movement of U.S. Gulf Coast oil to the U.S. East 
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Defense Mobilization “released a statement that, ‘with the approval of the 
President,’ the Interior Department had been requested to authorize fifteen 
American oil companies to coordinate efforts to provide oil to compensate for” 
the shortage resulting from the crisis.324  
5. The Power Not Used: Interacting with Congress  
Eisenhower refrained from using his power under Article II, section 3 to “on 
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them.”325 Article II 
section 3 clearly gives the President discretion to convene both or either house, 
but does not require him to do so. There is evidence that Eisenhower 
considered calling Congress for a special session, but he ultimately decided 
against it326 Congress only came into play a month later in January 1957.327 
The Congress was in the hands of the Democrats, and Eisenhower might have 
thought that it would not be entirely supportive of his determination to 
abandon a major Western Power and thereby support two hostile powers, 
Egypt’s leader Nasser and the Soviet Union.328 Domestic politics also play a 
part in mighty decisions related to matters of war and peace.329 
 
Coast in foreign-flag tankers”). Compare this “camouflage operation” to the French 
camouflaging its troops and airplanes as Israeli at the beginning of the Suez operation. See 
KYLE, supra note 17, at 343-44 (“In accordance with the bilateral section of the Protocol of 
Sѐvres, the two French squadrons—thirty-six Mystѐres and F84s—took up their position on 
Israeli airfields on the eve of battle.”).  
324 NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 273 (citing Circular Telegram From the Department of 
State to All Diplomatic Missions, Legations, and the Mission at the United Nations (Nov. 
29, 1956), in DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, SUEZ CRISIS, JULY 26-DECEMBER 31, 1956, VOLUME XVI, at 
1214 (Nina J. Noring & John P. Glennon, eds., 1990) that the Director of the Office of 
Defense Mobilization with the President’s approval “today requested the Secretary of the 
Interior to authorize fifteen US oil companies to coordinate the efforts they have been 
making individually to assist in handling the oil supply problem resulting from the closing 
of the Suez Canal and some pipelines in the Middle East”).  
325 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
326 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527 (stating that since Congress had not met since the 
elections, there were “’dramatic secret meetings of the Committee’ [that] were held ‘after 
dark one evening before Congress was even organised, in an atmosphere of suspense and 
urgency”). This may be compared to both British and French concern for activating war 
power when parliament is not in session. Compare supranote 64 and accompanying text 
(describing that although the power to declare war does not require consulting Parliament, 
Parliamentary votes of no confidence are a method to control the Executives’ use of the war 
powers), with supranote 111 and accompanying text (discussing Article 7 of the French 
Constitution which requires a vote of the National Assembly before war powers are 
activated). 
327 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 275-77 (“As 1957 dawned, Eisenhower launched a 
legislative offensive that, by any measure, was breathtaking.”). 
328 See id. at 265 (“While he had won a second term with 57 percent of the vote and 457-
73 in the Electoral College, Ike still faced a Democratic Congress with a two-seat majority 
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With the defeat of the two European-Colonial powers, brought about 
through the deft deployment of his Article II powers, the President confronted 
a vacuum created by his own actions. Because the Middle East was understood 
in the West strictly in terms of the Cold War, the concern was to chiefly 
prevent the Soviet Union from further benefitting from that change.330 It was 
thus that the United States escalated its involvement in the Middle East. This 
could not have been accomplished through Article II powers, as potent as they 
were. Money had to be allocated and further powers to act had to be 
authorized.331 Here Griffin’s cycle of accountability332 and Zeisberg’s 
relational theory333 come into play. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower 
 
in the Senate and a thirty-three-seat margin in the House.”). 
329 See GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 258 (“There is a reasonable amount of evidence that 
presidents have made decisions for war based in part on considerations of domestic 
politics.”). 
330 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 278 (“A Middle East split into two armed camps, one 
committed to the West and the other to the Soviet Union, could set the stage for 
Armageddon. To Eisenhower, this meant heading off any Soviet effort to gain a significant 
foothold in the region.”). 
331 The history of the relationship between Congress and the Executive in the area of 
foreign policy (including war making) powers are beyond the scope of this article. It is 
worth taking account of the ebb and flow of this relationship during the 20th century and 
beyond. By the mid-1950s Executive power to form foreign policy and introduce U.S. 
forces into hostilities was somewhat beyond its WWII peak but was still quite potent. See 
ROBERT DAVID JOHNSON, CONGRESS AND THE COLD WAR xvii (2006) (describing in the 
1950s the “post war constitutional revolution, characterized by the dramatic decline of 
congressional power over war and treaties”). It would take Congressional leaders more time 
to infuse power and influence into Congress’ potential foreign policy powers. See id. at 71 
(“Over the next several years, however, various members [of Congress] would discover 
alternative ways of marshaling the institution’s powers: focusing on foreign policy issues 
related to appropriations, using the proliferation of subcommittees to influence policy, or 
highlighting issues or areas of the world neglected by the administration.”). As historian 
Robert David Johnson observed in his “Congress and the Cold War,” these constitutional 
powers were more subtle and went beyond the salient power to approve treaties and declare 
war. See id. at xxiii (“Understanding the congressional response to the Cold War, however, 
requires looking beyond instances when Congress did (or did not) declare war or approve 
treaties.”). Instead, other facets of legislative power become important: “the spending 
measures [appropriations power]; the internal workings of a Congress increasingly 
dominated by subcommittees; and the ability of individual legislators to affect foreign 
affairs by changing the way that policymakers and the public thought about international 
questions—qualities inherently more difficult for historians to measure.” Id.  
332 See Griffin, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the “cycle of accountability” as inter-
branch interaction between the executive and legislative branches where “each branch 
knows that its decisions will be reviewed by the other” and a “pattern of mutual testing and 
deliberation results”). 
333 See ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 13-19 (“I argue that the branches’ powerful 
governance and epistemic capacities can be used to support constructions of constitutional 
war powers that are well adapted to the security context of their own time.”). 
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delivered a special message to Congress.334 He announced what came to be 
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, which initiated American presence in the 
Middle East.335 The doctrine provided that a country could request American 
economic and/or military aid if it was being threatened by armed aggression 
from another state.336 It was expected that threats will come from the Soviet 
Union.337 
Inter-branch negotiations ended with a more moderate and balanced bill 
than Eisenhower had wanted. 
On January 1, 1957, [the President] . . . invited a bipartisan legislative 
delegation to the White House. In a four-hour conference, he outlined a 
draft resolution giving him authority to send troops to any Middle Eastern 
nation that requested assistance against a Communist threat, on the 
grounds ‘that modern war might be a matter of hours only . . . Under a 
closed rule, the resolution sailed through the House, whose institutional 
structure prevented forcefully challenging the executive against the 
leadership’s wishes. In the Senate, the president received overwhelming 
Republican support . . . A wide array of Democrats, on the other hand, 
questioned the resolution’s constitutional, policy, and pragmatic 
necessity, but they struggled to reconcile their positions with their 
previous expansive interpretations of presidential power.338 
This joint resolution was “a vaguely worded resolution targeted at a region 
the administration could not precisely define to meet a threat that the 
administration could not specifically identify.”339 
Counterfactuals come into play. Had Congress been fully consulted earlier, 
could American involvement in the Middle East look different? Is this a story 
that supports the idea that at least when it comes to war, collective judgment, 
 
334 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 276 (describing Eisenhower’s address on January 5 to a 
joint session of Congress where he requested “economic and military assistance to friendly 
Middle East states” and advance authorization for “the use of American military forces to 
thwart aggression or head off communist subversion”). 
335 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527 (“Eisenhower . . . was, therefore, asking Congress to 
agree in advance to military action in support of the territorial integrity and political 
independence of states in the Middle East.”). 
336 For an excellent discussion of Foreign States and their potential claims under the 
United States Constitution, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 
73 VA. L. REV. 483, 495-96 (1987) (“In foreign affairs cases, as elsewhere, the federal courts 
have forged a doctrine favoring consistent application of constitutional norms even when the 
claimant is nontraditional—a foreigner rather than a citizen, or a juridical person rather than 
a natural one.”). 
337 See KYLE, supra note 17, at 527-28 (asserting that the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
motivated by fears of “International Communism” and Russia’s focus on “power politics” in 
the Middle East). 
338 JOHNSON, supra note 331, at 70 (2006). 
339 Id. at 71; see also WOOLLACOTT; supra note 1, at 129-48 (analyzing the effects of the 
Suez war on the wars fought by the U.S. in Iraq in the 1990s and the 21 century). 
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as messy as it is, may be superior to a fast, decisive and vigorous unitary 
decision-making? Griffin and Zeisberg’s recommendations concerning 
increasing accountability and better interaction between the two branches of 
the government are useful for assessing the effort to avoid a war as well as for 
evaluating a decision to go to war.340  
CONCLUSION 
What constitutional lessons may be drawn from the Suez War and its 
aftermath? Certainly it appears to have been a war to make more wars. After 
the Suez events each of the belligerents engaged in many a war, which they 
were mostly, but not always, careful to characterize as an “armed conflict” not 
rising to the level of war. The brakes, checks and balances available in the 
belligerents’ constitutional regimes as well as the compromises between 
morality and power embedded in the Charter of the United Nations were 
honored in the breach. The Suez war  was one of the major events in the 1950s 
that chilled the aspirations of the post war era and permitted a manipulable and 
manipulated conception of law—both international and domestic—to grow. It 
thus served to encourage, rather than deter, more wars. 
The United States while playing the role of Diplomat in Chief almost got 
involved in a war as a result of the crisis, and in the aftermath it got more and 
more tangled in the periodic conflagrations in the Middle East.341 Soon enough 
the United States stepped into the French boots and led the bloody war in 
Vietnam.342 
Each of the parties to the Suez story had a previously set legal process, 
which governed the decision to engage in military conflicts. No party engaged 
in a bona fide implementation of this process. Secrecy played a major part in 
the belligerents’ decision to go to war. The fragile separation between the civil 
and military chain of command greatly shaped France’s decision to go to war. 
Given the close relationship between the French and Israeli military command, 
France also had a decisive influence on the Israeli decision to go to war. The 
concentration of power in the hands of the Israeli prime minister and the lack 
 
340 See GRIFFIN, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining the importance of accountability and 
institutional structures with war powers because of the risk of “policy catastrophe” if the 
nation goes to war without “the meaningful deliberation and consent of the legislative and 
executive branches of government”); ZEISBERG, supra note 3, at 18 (“I argue that the 
branches’ powerful governance and epistemic capacities can be used to support 
constructions of constitutional war powers that are well adapted to the security context of 
their own time.”). 
341 See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 286 (“Eisenhower’s historic contribution following the 
Suez crisis was the commitment of the United States to maintaining the stability and 
security of the Middle East.”). 
342 See JOHNSON, supra note 331, at 67 (discussing the evolution of the executive’s power 
as both events in the Middle East under Eisenhower and the Vietnam War in 1964 
“established a precedent for significantly eroding the legislative role in intentional affairs”). 
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of compartmentalization between Israeli civil and military command also 
propelled Israel to abide by the French plan to assign to Israel the role of 
aggressor. In defense of Israel, one may point to the fact that the Israeli 
leadership had no tradition to draw on, and the example it was getting from its 
two senior partners was that constitutional arrangements may and should be 
circumvented in order to achieve goals determined by realpolitik. Even the 
United States, whose President proclaimed devotion to morality and the rule of 
law, appeared to have been willing to turn a blind eye to the honored principles 
had the belligerents shown more resolve and proficiency in achieving their 
goals. It is also interesting to reflect on the complex web inside the executive 
branch. The three prime ministers who came together to plan the war engaged 
in massive compartmentalization inside their cabinets, marginalizing their 
ministeries  of foreign affairs and silencing the voice of diplomacy.343 
The paradigm of executive control to determine whether or not to go to war 
appears to have been solidly entrenched among all the partners to the conflict, 
regardless of what their Constitution or constitutional traditions required.344 
 
343 Christian Pineau was an exception. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 316 (highlighting 
Christian Pineau’s contributions to the secret negotiations at Sèvres preceding the Suez 
Crisis). However, he too made sure to keep the French ministry of foreign affairs in the 
dark. See id. at 331 (describing the small number of French government officials who knew 
about France’s plan and the Sèvres agreement, which meant that “the entire Quai d’Orsay 
[France’s foreign ministry] was cut out of the circuit of those who knew about Sѐvres”). By 
contrast, the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles was actively involved in the Suez 
Crisis. NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 203 (highlighting Dulles’ active role as he attempted to 
prevent the Suez Crisis and action once the Crisis began). However, he fell ill and was not 
as influential or deft as he could have been had he been in good health. See id. at 232-33 
(describing Dulles cancer treatments and hospitalization in November 1956). 
344 Finally, one should ask what significance should attach to “the body”—the body 
politic, the body social, and the personal body of the politicians (men, women, healthy, sick, 
handsome, ugly, young, old, sexy, vulnerable, experienced, and manipulative) in the 
conflicts and intrigues which formed the Suez crisis. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
was extremely ill from the period leading to the Suez invasion until his resignation a few 
weeks later. See NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 268 (“By November 19, rumors abounded that 
Anthony Eden was ill.”). So was Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who was 
confined to bed all through the week of the actual invasion. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 344 
(“Ben-Gurion was . . . looking tired, his voice weak and his temperature high.”). French 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, another central player, was also ill. British Foreign 
Minister Selwyn Lloyd was “exhausted and confused.” See id. at 302 (“I have seldom seen . 
. . a man more confused and unhappy than Lloyd was on that occasion.”). U.S. Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles was fighting cancer, and in November, 1956, was hospitalized. See 
NICHOLS, supra note 8, at 233 (describing Dulles cancer treatment on Saturday November 3 
where “the surgeons at Walter Reed Hospital had removed a cancerous tumor from the 
secretary’s colon”). Perhaps Dulles would have behaved differently if he were not so ill. 
How did the condition of these important figures affect their decision-making processes? 
Should domestic constitutional law, shaping the body politic, be aware of or ignore these 
conditions?What should one make of the fact that the British considered France to be “’the 
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But one should ask if matters were likely to be fundamentally different had 
the respective Parliaments been more genuinely involved, and would a 
different result be more likely? Certainly not in the case of France and Israel 
where public opinion (perhaps shaped by the Executive, which brings us to the 
question of a free press and freedom of expression in democracies) leaned 
quite heavily in favor of war.345 Even in England, it is not clear that Anthony 
Eden would have been so solidly defeated had the military operations been 
carried out successfully within the time frame originally contemplated.346 
And yet, the decades since the Suez War have edged toward a change of 
paradigm. The legislative branches of all four countries have made a serious 
effort to change the norms and give legislative deliberation more influence 
over the decision to go to war.347 Only Israel lags behind, its parliament not yet 
 
sick man’ of Europe,” and that Eisenhower called France a “helpless, hopeless mass of 
protoplasm”? See William I. Hitchcock, Crisis and Modernization in the Fourth Republic: 
From Suez to Rome, in CRISIS AND RENEWAL IN FRANCE, 1918-1962, at 222 (Kenneth Moure 
& Martin S. Alexander eds., 2002).  
In the British Parliament, following the invasion, members protested that John Bull (symbol 
of Great Britain) was seduced by Marianne (symbol of France). I suggest that a role reversal 
had occurred in the French-Israeli relations. See KYLE, supra note 17, at 293. There, France 
played not the beguiling woman, but rather the powerful seductive older male to the 
vulnerable and needy Israeli maiden. France offered Israel material and moral support (in 
this order) in exchange for compliance and obedience. See id. at 218 (“[A] stream of French 
landing-craft was delivering the tanks, planes and guns which the Israelis desperately 
needed in secret landings at dead of night, often attended by Ben-Gurion and a few 
especially privileged observers.”). French arms, in large quantities, were the glittering 
diamonds that intoxicated Israel and encouraged it to perform the role assigned to it by the 
European power. See id. (detailing political and military interactions between France and 
Israel culminating in France delivering Israel needed military supplies). Perhaps Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion understood this dynamic at some level, and this is the reason 
why he developed a high fever as Israeli troops charged into Egypt. See id. at 344 
(describing Ben-Gurion’s health as he was “[o]bviously suffering from fever”). This was not 
a good situation for a proud man to find himself in. 
345 See TURNER, supra note 17, at 259 (“The French legislature passed a vote of 
confidence in Mollet, and he boldly defended the Suez operation, linking it with the need to 
combat terrorists in French Algeria and to protect western democracy against dictators like 
Nasser.”). 
346 See id. at 288-89 (“Eden’s view was that the real mistakes occurred after the 
ceasefire, not before it, and they occurred because other world leaders acted in an 
unexpected and unreasonable manner.”). 
347 Compare War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this 
chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure 
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”), and Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541) (“That the 
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”), with supra note 60 and 
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confident enough to assert a more active role in matters of security because it 
is fearful of compromising security imperatives. Still, a review of the action 
taken by the legislatures of all countries involved, even Israel, reflects 
recognition that leaving matters to an unregulated executive decision is a bad 
way to guarantee the well being of the country. Even though Griffin and 
Zeisberg address only the U.S. constitutional regime, their books reflect this 
more general trend. The paradigm is in the process of shifting, but what a 
genuine change will look like and whether it will happen is yet unclear. 
 
accompanying text (explaining that within the United Kingdom, “[i]issues related to war 
have been long recognized as royal prerogatives, solidly vested in the hands of the executive 
(the crown)”), and supra notes 111, 119-120 and accompanying text (exploring France’s 
lack of a “constitutional check on a trigger happy executive” who may circumvent 
constitutional requirements of a declaration of war ). 
